

## DRAFT

### Comparative Politics Survey G6412

Monday 10:00-11:50

711 IAB

Spring 2015

Tim Frye

Department of Political Science

1214 International Affairs Building

tmf2@columbia.edu – e-mail preferred.

Office hours: Thursday 3-5, or by appointment.

### Overview

This course offers a survey of major themes in comparative politics. It is one of two survey courses in comparative politics offered by the department. G6411 places a greater emphasis on the micro-level building blocks of comparative politics, while G6412 places greater emphasis on outcomes, but there will inevitably be some overlap. The two courses complement each other, but need not be taken in any particular order. The course includes a great deal of student involvement and is designed to help you educate yourselves about the major themes in comparative politics and develop the analytic skills need to conduct research at a high level.

The course is designed for Ph.D. students who are preparing to take comprehensive exams, but is open to other students as well. Ph.D. students preparing for comprehensive exams will be given preference over other students. The class works best with 16 students or less.

### Requirements and Evaluation:

1. **Participation in Seminar:** Students must be prepared each week to discuss the core readings. Students who are making any sort of presentation are not exempt from this requirement (25 percent).
2. **Research Design:** Each student will write a short paper (10-15 pages) that identifies a research question, explains why this question is important, and then proposes a strategy for answering the question. Feel free to conduct the data analysis as time and topic permits. (25 percent) Due before class April 27.
3. **Practice Comp:** Take Home Version (25 percent). Due in class March 30.
4. **Final Exam:** Practice Comp in Class (25 per cent). May 4.

Assignments turned in late (that means after the start of class on the day they are due) lose one letter grade for each day they are late. For example, an “A” paper becomes a “B” paper.

### 1. Participation

A critical component of the course is lively discussion of the week’s readings. You should be prepared to discuss each reading on the syllabus for each week. You have not really done the

readings until you are able to succinctly restate the argument, describe the methodology, and identify some strengths and weaknesses of the work. In other words, reading the article once, or worse, skimming the abstract, the introduction and conclusion alone, will not be sufficient. We will discuss several strategies for reading articles to get the most out of them.

You should assess the logical consistency, clarity, and novelty of the theoretical argument. Does it produce new insights? Are the assumptions of the theory clear and reasonable? Is the logic of the theory internally consistent? Do the hypotheses flow logically from the theory? Does the theory generate hypotheses that could be tested, but are not? Does the theory suggest possible causal mechanisms? Are those mechanisms tested?

You should also assess the evidence provided in support of the argument. Are the empirical tests convincing? Are the procedures used to assess the argument described adequately? Are the measures valid and reliable? Does the author consider multiple mechanisms which may link variables? Are other interpretations of the evidence more plausible? What of the possibility of reverse causality, omitted variable bias, selection bias, and endogeneity? How important are these problems? Can they be addressed? If so, how? What other tests could have been done to assess the argument?

You should also consider the implications of the argument. Has the author made claims that extend beyond the evidence? Are the findings important? If so, for what? For substantive outcomes? For normative reasons? For social science? (Filling a hole in the literature is not always a reason to write an article. Some holes aren't worth filling.) Has the author convinced you that you should care about the finding? How does this work relate to similar work? To what related topics could the theory, evidence, or research design apply? Are there policy implications for the work?

Remember to consider strengths and weaknesses of the arguments. Be wary of the "graduate student disease." Symptoms include over the top criticism accompanied by an inability to recognize high quality work.

The participation grade includes three components:

*Class Discussion.* You will be graded on the quality of your participation not just on the quantity. Making a few well thought out additions to the debate is much preferred to frequent, but shallow interventions. I love to cold call on students and I can assure you that each student will either speak of their own accord or be called upon to discuss a particular reading.

*Presentation.* Each week, 20-25 minutes of the seminar will be devoted to presentations by students on questions that are posed on the syllabus. Other topics are also welcome. These presentations will be **10 minutes (no more)** each, and should use slides. We will then have discussions about the materials. In general, weak presentations will simply summarize the readings ("Smith says x, Jones says y"). Strong presentations will:

Describe any key conceptual issues that must be addressed by work on the question (e.g., a presentation on inequality might discuss different ways of conceptualizing inequality);

Describe the central arguments/debates in the literature on the question (e.g., a presentation

on corruption might focus on different types of variables –such as regime type, decentralization, level of development -- that influence corruption levels);

Describe thorny methodological issues that bedevil work on the question (e.g., a presentation on social revolutions might discuss the problems created by the small-n nature of the phenomenon).

Offer criticisms and/or suggest pathways for future research.

To help students get started, the syllabus lists "Suggested Readings." These might serve as a place to begin, but students must do their own bibliographic research. Students should obviously not feel obligated to cover all of these suggested readings. Students should post their presentations on the "Lecture" section of CourseWorks. They should also create a bibliography of the works they have consulted. This will then create a general resource that should be helpful in preparing for comprehensive exams.

*Reaction Comments.* Each week each student will post reaction comments on the course blog. These comments should not exceed a paragraph. A sentence or two will do. Do not summarize the readings. The comments are due on Sunday at 6:00 PM. Be sure to read other posts before coming to class.

## **2. Research Design Essay**

The research design paper (10-15 pages maximum) should identify a research question, explain why this question is important, propose a strategy for answering the question, and then discuss possible strengths and weaknesses of the proposal. A weak essay will simply do the above. A strong paper will propose a novel topic that sheds light on an important debate; identifies how and why this paper may make a contribution to the literature and propose a reasonable research strategy. A strong paper will also include a careful critique of the research design identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the proposal. This is a chance for you to begin to develop your own ideas for research even if you do not have time to actually collect the data necessary to assess the argument. Due before class on April 21. You can post it to Courseworks under "Assignments."

**3. Practice Comprehensive Exam: Take Home Version.** You will write an essay of no more than 3000 words that answers a comprehensive exam style question. I will pass out a list of three questions and you will answer one. The questions will be based on the first 8 weeks of reading and will be due in class on March 30. The comprehensive exams are designed to illustrate how well you comprehend the literature in comparative politics and your answer should demonstrate your knowledge. It is not a contest to see how many citations you can cram into a single essay. Indeed, it is usually better to address one or two themes in your answer in depth rather than to address a range of topics in a superficial fashion. You can post it to courseworks under "Assignments."

**4. Practice Comprehensive Exam: In Class Final.** On May 4, you will answer a comprehensive exam style question in the 1:50 minutes allotted for class. This will offer a chance to experience all the thrills of the comprehensive exam in a much lower risk environment.

## Materials

Most works are available from JSTOR or the Columbia Electronic Library. These are marked with “J.” I will also post works on the Courseworks website. These are marked with a “C.” Many are also available via Google and other electronic sources. The readings may change in some weeks based on student interest.

Required Reading available through Book Culture 536 W. 112th between Broadway and Amsterdam.

- 1) Wilkinson, Steven. 2004. *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge University Press
- 2) Huber, John and Charles Shipan, *Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. New York Cambridge University Press.
- 3) Blaydes, Lisa. 2013. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. Cambridge University Press.
- 4) Brusco, Valeria, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Susan Stokes. 2013. *Brokers, Voters and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- 5) Fiona McGillivray. *Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industrial Policy*. Princeton University Press.

### Jan. 26. Week 1. Introduction: Thinking about Thinking

Lehrer, John. 2008. “[Eureka](#)” *New Yorker*.

Heath, Chip and *Stan Heath Made To Stick*. Intro, [Chapters 1, 4, 6 and Epilogue](#).

Huber, John. 2013. “Is Theory Getting Lost in the Identification Revolution?” ms.  
<http://themonkeycage.org/2013/06/14/is-theory-getting-lost-in-the-identification-revolution/>

Roger Van Oech. Roger Van Oech. *A Whack on the Side of the Head*. Warner Books. Third Edition  
[http://courses.washington.edu/art166sp/documents/Spring2012/readings/week\\_3/AWhackOnTheSideOfTheHead.pdf](http://courses.washington.edu/art166sp/documents/Spring2012/readings/week_3/AWhackOnTheSideOfTheHead.pdf)

### February 2. Week 2. Institutions and the State

Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and the European State*

James Scott, *Seeing Like a State*

Jeffrey Herbst. 2000. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton University Press. TBA. C

Robinson, James. "Review of States and Power in Africa" *Journal of Economic Literature*. Vol. XL (June 2002), pp. 510–51.

**Presentation Topic One.** Do institutional legacies influence contemporary outcomes? How can we know whether this is the case?

Wittenberg, Jason. "[What is a Historical Legacy?](#)" 2011. Berkeley

Kitschelt, Herbert. 2002. "[Accounting for Postcommunist Regime Diversity: What Counts as a Good Cause?](#)" In *Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Gregorz Ekiert and Stephen Hanson, Cambridge University Press.

Darden, Keith and Grzymala-Busse, Anna. 2006. "[The Great Divide: Literacy, nationalism and the communist collapse](#)." *World Politics*. 59: 1, 83-115.

Nunn, Nathaniel and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. "The Slave Trade and the Origins of Mistrust in Africa." *American Economic Review*. 101: December, 321-52.

Lustick, Ian. 1996. "History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias." *American Political Science Review* 90:3 605-18.

Giuliano, Paolo and Nathaniel Nunn. 2012. "The Transmission of Democracy: From the Village to the Nation State." NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 18722. 1-12.

Engerman S, Sokoloff K. 2002. "[Factor endowments, inequality, and paths of development among New World Economies](#)." *Economia* 3(1):41-88.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson. 2001. "[The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development](#)." *American Economic Review* 91:5 1369-1401.

Coatsworth, John. 2005. "[Structures, Endowments and Institutions in the Economic History of Latin America](#)," *Latin American Research Review*, 40:3.

Pop-Eleches, Grigore 2007. "Historical Legacies and Post-Communist Regime Change." *The Journal of Politics* 69: 4, 908-926.

Wittenberg J. 2006. *Crucibles of Political Loyalty: Church Institutions and Electoral Continuity in Hungary*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press

Scott Page. 2006. "Path Dependence." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 1: 87-115.

David, Paul A., "Clio and the Economics of QWERTY" (in Economic History: A Necessary Though Not Sufficient Condition for an Economist), *American Economic Review*, Vol. 75, No. 2, *Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association*. (May, 1985), pp. 332-337.

Neil M. Kay. 2013. "Lock-In, Path Dependence, and the Internationalization of QWERTY." University of Strathclyde. Ms.  
[http://seminars.wcfia.harvard.edu/files/pegroup/files/neil\\_kay\\_2013.pdf](http://seminars.wcfia.harvard.edu/files/pegroup/files/neil_kay_2013.pdf)

**Presentation Topic Two:** To what extent can field experiments resolve debates about the relationship between institutions and economic development?

Deaton, A (2009) "Instruments of development: Randomization in the tropics, and the search for the elusive keys to economic development, [NBER Working Paper](#)

Alan S. Gerber, Donald P. Green, and Edward H. Kaplan. "The Illusion of Learning from Observational Research." from *Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics*, edited by Ian Shapiro, Rogers M. Smith, Tarek E. Masoud . Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy Weinstein. 2009. "Field Experiments and the Political Economy of Development" *Annual Review of Political Science*

Duflo, Esther, Rachel Glennerster, and Michael Kremer, "[Using Randomization in Development Economics Research: A Toolkit](#)"

Various Authors in APSA-CD Newsletter October 2011 symposium on experiments.

### **February 9. Week 3. Bureaucracy and State Capacity**

Huber, John and Charles Shipan, *Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. New York Cambridge University Press. Chaps 1-4, 6.

Scheve, Kenneth and David Stasavage. 2012. "Democracy, War, and Wealth: Lessons from Two Centuries of Inheritance Taxation," *American Political Science Review*. 106:1, 81:102.

Moe, Terry. "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story." *Journal of Law Economics and Organization*, 1990 7: 213-253. Also Comment by Williamson. C, J

Andrei Shleifer and Edward Glaeser. 2002. "Legal Origins." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* November, 1193-1229. J

### **Recommended:**

Rasul, Imran and Daniel Rogger. 2013. "Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service." 2013. Ms. London.

Geddes, Barbara. "A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies," *American Political Science Review* 85:2 (1991), 371-92. (for more see her book, *Politicians' Dilemma*.) Cooter, Robert. 2000. "Administering" *The Strategic Constitution*. Princeton University Press. 79-99.

Diego Gambetta, 1994. *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business Of Private Protection*.

Leonard Wantchekon, 2004. The Paradox of "Warlord" Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation. *American Political Science Review* 98 (1): 17-33.

Elisabeth Jean Wood. 2001. "An Insurgent Path to Democracy: Popular Mobilization, Economic Interests and Regime Transition in South Africa and El Salvador." *Comparative Political Studies*. 2001 34: 86

Volkov, Vadim. 2002. *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Role of Force in Russian Capitalism*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

**Presentation Topic One:** Where do good states come from?

Andrei Shleifer and Edward Glaeser. 2002. "Legal Origins." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* November, 1193-1229. J

Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, and Jean Francois-Richard. 2003. "The Transplant Effect." *American Journal of Comparative Law* 51: 163-204. J.

**Presentation Topic Two:** The military is typically the greatest obstacle to democratization. Do you agree?

Goemans, Hein and Alexandre Debs. 2010. Regime Type, The Fate of Leaders and War. *American Political Science Review*, Volume 104, No. 3 (August), pp.430-446.

#### **Week 4. February 16. Corruption**

Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny. 1993. "[Corruption](#)" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, August, 599-617.

Hellman JS, Jones G, Kaufmann D. 2003. "[Seize the state, seize the day: an empirical analysis of state capture and corruption in transition economies](#)." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 31(4):751--73

Chong, Alberto, Ana L. De La O, Dean Karlan and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. "Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes." NBER. Working Paper. 17679.

John McMillan and Pablo Zoido. "[How To Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru](#)." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 2004. 18:4, 69-92. [JSTOR.] Also available electronically via the library.

Recommended:

Ben Olken and Rohini Panda. 2012. "Corruption in Developing Countries." Ms 1-51.

Daniel Treisman, "[What Have We Learned about Corruption?](#)" *Annual Review of Political Science*. 2007. 10:211-244.

Claudio Ferraz and Fred Finan. (2008). "[Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes](#)", *QJE*, 123(2), 703-745. J.

**Presentation Topic One:** How can governance be measured?

Marcus Kurtz and Andrew Schrenk. "[Growth and Governance: Models, Measures, and Mechanisms](#)." *Journal of Politics* Vol. 69:2 (May).2007. also "Growth and Governance: A Defense" *Journal of Politics* 69:2. May.

Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2007. "[Growth and Governance: A Reply](#)." *Journal of Politics* 69, 2: 555–562. J

Steven Voight. "[How \(Not\) to Measure Institutions?](#)"

**Presentation Topic Two:** Can greater transparency reduce corruption?

Leonid Peisakhin and Paul Pinto. 2011. "Is Transparency an Effective Anti-Corruption Strategy?" Evidence from a Field Experiment in India." *Regulation and Governance* 4:3, 261-280.  
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2010.01081.x/full>

John McMillan and Pablo Zoido. "[How To Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru](#)." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 2004. 18:4, 69-92. [JSTOR.] Also available electronically via the library.

Brunetti, A., and B. Weder, "[A Free Press Is Bad News for Corruption](#)," *Journal of Public Economics*, 87 (2003), 1801–182

Reinikka, R., and J. Svensson, "[Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda](#)", *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 3(2–3) (2005), 259–267.

Thomas Barnebeck Andersen, Jeanet Bentzen, Carl-Johan Dalgaard, and Pablo Selaya. 2011. "[Does the Internet Reduce Corruption? Evidence from U.S. States and across Countries](#)." *World Bank Economic Observer*.

**Recommended:**

Olken, Benjamin and Patrick Barron. "The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh. Working Paper 13145 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w13145>

Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean Francois-Richard. 2003. "Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect." *European Economic Review* 47: 165-195.



Scott Gehlbach. 2006. "The Consequences of Collective Action: An Incomplete Contracts Approach." *American Journal of Political Science*. 50:3, 802-823.

Fisman, Raymond (2001), "Estimating the Value of Political Connections." *American Economic Review* 91 (4), pp. 1095-1102. [http://www.1.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/rfisman/estimating\\_the\\_value.pdf](http://www.1.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/rfisman/estimating_the_value.pdf)

## February 23. Week 5. Democracy in Action

Mcgillivray, Fiona. 2004. *Privileging Industry: The Comparative Politics of Trade and Industry Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bates, Robert. 1981. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*, Berkeley: University of California Press. [81-132](#).

Olken, Benjamin. 2010. "Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia." *American Political Science Review* 104: 2 243-267.

Robert Dahl. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chapter 1.

Besley, Tim and Burgess, Robin. 2002. "[The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India, Quarterly Journal of Economics](#)." 117/4.

### Recommended:

Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge. Chapters 1-2.

Satyanath. Shanker, Nico Voigtlander and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2013. "Bowling for Fascism: Social Capital and the Rise of the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany, 1919-33." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 19201. 1-46.

**Presentation Topic One:** Under What Conditions Do Politicians Favor Core Versus Swing Voters?

Cox, Gary and Matthew McCubbins. 1986. "Electoral Politics in a Redistributive Game." *Journal of Politics*. 48, 370-89.

Dixit, Avinash and Johnathan Londregan. 1996. "The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive Politics." *Journal of Politics*. 58, 1132-55.

Hellman, Joel, "[Winners Take All: The Pitfalls of Partial Reform](#)," World Politics, January 1998. J.

## **Presentation Topic Two: What are Secure Property Rights and How do they Come About?**

Douglas C. North and Barry Weingast, "[Constitutions and Credible Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England](#)," *Journal of Economic History*, 49, 803-832.

David Stasavage. 2002. "[Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited](#)." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*. 18,1. 155-86.

Ronald Coase. 1960. "[The Problem of Social Cost](#)." *The Journal of Law and Economics* 3:1, 1-44, J C

Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson and Andrei Shleifer and Simon Johnson. 2001. "[Coase Against the Coasians](#)." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* August, 116: 3, 853-899.

Benjamin Jones and Benjamin Olken 2005. "[Do Leaders Matter? National Leaders and Growth Since World War II](#)." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. Vol. 120, No. 3, 835-864 J

Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson. 2005. "[Unbundling Institutions](#)." *Journal of Political Economy*. 113: 5, 949-995.

## **Presentation Topic: How do Endowments Affect Democratization?**

Boix, Carles. *Redistribution and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, 1-131, 233-240.

Haggard, Stephan and Robert Kaufman. 2012. "Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule." *American Political Science Review*. 106:3 495- 516.

Woodberry Robert. 2012. "The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy." *American Political Science Review* 106:2, 244-274.

Hariri, Jacob Gerner 2012. August. "The Autocratic Legacy of Early Statehood." *American Political Science Review*. 106:3 471-494.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Chapters 1-3.

Moore, Barrington. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Beacon Press. 1966.

Geddes, Barbara, 2007. "What Causes Democratization?" In eds. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes. *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. 317-339.

## **Presentation Topic One: Does Natural Resource Wealth Impeded Democracy?**

Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, “ [Introduction](#)” What Is the Problem with Natural Resource Wealth?, 1-20.

Haber, Stephen and Victor Menaldo, 2011. “[Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse](#),” *American Political Science Review*. Feb. 1-26.

Ross, Stephen and Jørgen Juel Andersen 2011. “[Making the Resource Curse Disappear: A re-examination of Haber and Menaldo’s “Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism?”](#)” Draft: September 30, 2011.

Dunning, Thad. 2008. *Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes* (Cambridge University Press. [1-36](#). [107-146](#)).

Egorov G, Guriev S, Sonin K. 2009. "[Why resource poor dictators allow freer media: a theory and evidence from panel data](#)." (have to be logged in to CU to see link) *American Political Science Review* 103(4):645--68

Tsui, Kevin. “More Oil, Less Democracy: Evidence from Worldwide Crude Oil Discoveries.” Ms. Clemson University, January 20, 2009

Sachs, J. and A. M. Warner. 1995. “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth.” NBER Working Paper No. 5398.

Sachs, J. and A. M. Warner. 2001. “The Curse of Natural Resources.” *European Economic Review* 45(4-6): 827-38.

Robinson, James A., Ragnar Torvik, and Thierry Verdier. 2006. The Political Foundations of the Resource Curse. *Journal of Development Economics* 79: 2 , 447-468

Ross, Michael, 2009. “Oil and Democracy Revisited, ms. UCLA. 1-50.

**Presentation Topic Two:** Does development aid function as a natural resource curse?

Djankov, Simeon, Jose G. Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol. “The Curse of Aid.” *Journal of Economic Growth*. <http://www.springerlink.com/content/b5369m3870553gl7/fulltext.pdf>

Morrison, Kevin M. What Can We Learn about the “Resource Curse” from Foreign Aid? *World Bank Research Observer*. Advance Access published October 27, 2010. Also C.

**March 2. Week 6. Representation and Accountability**

Introduction Plus Manin, Bernard and Adam Przeworski and Susan Stokes. "[Elections and Representation](#)" in *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, ed. by Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, Bernard Manin, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Fearon, James. 1999. "[Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians](#)" in *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, ed. by Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, Bernard Manin, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Susan Stokes. "[Policy Switches](#)" Stokes, Susan. 1999. What Do Policy Switches Tell Us about Democracy? In Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes and Bernard Manin, eds. *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Powell, Bingham and Guy Whitten. 1993. "[A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Into Account the Political Context](#)." *American Journal of Political Science*. 37:391-414.

Besley, Timothy. 2005. "[Political Selection](#)." *Journal of Political Economy*.

Maravall, Jose Maria. 2007. "[Accountability and the Survival of Governments](#)." In ed the *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, ed. Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

**Presentation Topic One:** What determines the choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies?

Boix, Carles. 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies," *American Political Science Review* 93:3: 609-624.

Cusack, Thomas, Iversen Torben, and David Soskice. 2007. "Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems." *American Political Science Review* 101 3 :373-391.

Calvo, Ernesto. 2009. "The competitive road to proportional representation: partisan biases and electoral regimes under increasing party competition." *World Politics*. 61:2, 254- 295.

Kreuzer, Markus. *American Political Science Review*. 2010.

Response by Cusack et al. APSR. 2010.

Response by Boix. APSR. 2010.

## **Week 7. March 9. Parties, Elections, and Electoral Rules**

Ordeshook, Peter and Olga Shevtsova. 1994. "Ethnic Heterogeneity, District Magnitude and Number of Parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 38:1, 100-123.

Gary Cox. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-5.\*

John Aldrich. 1995. *Why Parties? The Origins and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1995. Chapters 1-2.\*

Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins. 2007. Second edition. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Chapter 5.

John Huber. 2012. "Measuring Ethnic Voting: Do Proportional Electoral Laws Politicize Ethnicity?" *American Journal of Political Science* 56:4, October 986-1001.

### **Recommended:**

Carey, John and Matthew Shugart. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge University Press 1995.

**Presentation Topics One:** Does federalism matter for policy outcomes?

Rodden, Jonathan. *Hamilton's Paradox*: Chapter 4.

Barry Weingast. "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market Preserving Federalism," *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*. 11:1, 1-31.

Dan Treisman. 2007. *The Architecture of Government. Rethinking Political Decentralization*. Cambridge University Press.

-----  
**SPRING BREAK**  
-----

### **Week 8. March 23. Autocracy**

Under what conditions are autocrats accountable?

Blaydes, Lisa. 2013. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chaps. 1-6.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy. The Politics of Party Hegemony and its Demise*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-3. \*

Goemans, Hein, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Giacomo Chiazzi. 2009. "Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders," *Journal of Peace Research*. 46:2, 269-283.

Haber, Stephen. "Authoritarian Government." In eds. Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*.\*

Shih, Victor, Christopher Adolph and Mingxing Liu 2012. "Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China." *American Political Science Review*, 106:1, 166-187.

### **Recommended:**

Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument." American Political Science Association Annual Meetings.

Malesky, Edmund and Paul Schuler. 2011. "Noodling or Needling Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament." *American Political Science Review*. 104:3, 482-502.

Scott Gehlbach and Phil Keefer. 2011. "Investment without Democracy: Ruling-Party Institutionalization and Credible Commitment in Autocracies." *Journal of Comparative Economics*. 39(2):123-139.

Besley, Timothy and Masayuki Kudamatsu. 2007. "Making Autocracy Work." LSE STICERD Research Paper 48.

Jessica L. Weeks. 2009. "Accountable Autocrats? Post-War Punishment in Authoritarian Regimes." Paper prepared for delivery at the 2009 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association Toronto, Ontario

### **March 30. Week 9. Clientelism, Elections**

Stokes, Susan C, Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno, and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Calvo, Ernesto and Maria Victoria Murillo. 2004. "Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market." *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Oct., 2004), pp. 742-757.

Nichter, Simeon, 2008. "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying," *American Political Science Review*. 102:1 19-31.

Leeman, Lucas and Isabela Mares. "From Open Secrets to the Secret Ballot: The Economic and Political Determinants of Secret Ballot Reform." *Journal of Politics*.

Frye, Timothy, John Reuter, David Szakonyi. 2014. "Political Machines at Work: Workplace Mobilization and Electoral Subversion ." *World Politics*.

### **Recommended:**

Ana De La O. 2013. "Do Conditional Cash Transfers Affect Electoral Behavior? Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Mexico." *American Journal of Political Science* 57:1, 1-14.

Corstange, Dan. 2011. Dominant Parties, Dueling Machines and Vote Trafficking." Ms. New York.

Stokes, Susan, 2007. "[Political Clientelism.](#)" *Oxford Handbook of Political Science*. Oxford University Press.

Scott, James, Patron Client Politics and Political Change in South East Asia." 1972. *American Political Science Review* March 66: 1, 91-113.

Keefer, Philip Keefer and Razvan Vlaicu. 2008. "Democracy, Credibility and Clientelism." *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*. October. 24 (2), pp. 371-406 .

### **Presentation Topic One. What is the best way to measure political clientelism?**

Herbert Kitschelt and Kent Freeze. 2011. Programmatic Party Structuration: Developing and Comparing Cross National and Cross-Party Measures Using a New Global Data-set. [https://web.duke.edu/democracy/papers/1.1.Kitschelt\\_Freeze.pdf](https://web.duke.edu/democracy/papers/1.1.Kitschelt_Freeze.pdf)

### **April 6. Week 10. Participation**

Wilkinson, Steven. 2004. *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1-2 and 5-6.

Olson, Mancur. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1-65. C.

Trejo, Guillermo. 2009. "Religious Competition and Ethnic Mobilization in Latin America: Why the Catholic Church Promotes Indigenous Movements in Mexico," *American Political Science Review* 103:3.

King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret Roberts. 2013. "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism, but Silences Collective Expression." *American Political Science Review*, 107: 1-18.

Alexander Scacco. "Who Riots? Explaining Individual Level Participation in Ethnic Violence." Ms. New York, 1-28.

### **Recommended:**

Kuran, Timur 1991. "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolutions of 1989. *World Politics* 44:1, 7-48. J.

Susanne Lohmann 1994. "Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany 1989-91. *World Politics*, October.

Mark Beissinger. 1998. "Nationalist Violence and the State: Political Authority and Contentious Repertoires in the Former USSR." *Comparative Politics*. 30:4, 401-422.

### **Presentation Topic One: What determines voter turnout?**

### **Presentation Topic Two: Is "contentious politics" a useful concept?**

Douglas Macadam and Charles Tilly. 2007.

Sydney Tarrow. 1998. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press

### **April 13. Week 11. Public Goods, Identity, and Cleavages**

Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel Posner, and Jeremy Weinstein. (2007). "[Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision? An Experimental Approach](#)", *American Political Science Review* 101(4), 709-725.

Lyall J. 2010. "Are co-ethnics more effective counter-insurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War." *American Political Science Review* 104(1):1-20.

Kasara, Kimuli. 2007. "Tax Me If You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy, and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa." *American Political Science Review*. 101:1.

Paxton, Pamela. 2000. "Women's Suffrage in the Measurement of Democracy: Problems of Operationalization." *Studies in Comparative International Development*. 35:3, 92-111.

#### **Recommended:**

Dunning, Thad, and Lauren Harrison. 2010. "Cross-Cutting Cleavages and Ethnic Voting: An Experimental Study of Cousinage in Mali." *American Political Science Review* 104 (1): 21-39.

Paxton, Pamela, Sherri Kunovich, Melanie Hughes. 2007. "Gender in Politics." *Annual Review of Sociology*, 33:263-284.

Paxton, Pamela. "Gendering Democracy." In eds. Gary Goertz and Amy G. Mazur. *Politics, Gender and Concepts: Theory and Methodology*. Cambridge University Press.

### **April 20. Week 12. Political Economy of Development**

Stephen Haber et al. 2003. *The Politics of Property Rights: Political instability, Credible Commitments and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929*. Cambridge University Press.



Philip Keefer and Steven C. Knack. 2002. Polarization, Politics and Property Rights: Links Between Inequality and Growth. *Public Choice* 111 April 1-2, 127-154.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *American Economic Review* 91: 1369-1401.

Albouy, David. 2012. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment." *American Economic Review* 102: 3059-3076.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson. 2011. "Hither Thou Shalt Come, But No Further: Reply to "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment. Ms.

#### **April 27. Redistribution and Welfare**

Alesina Alesina and Edward, Glaeser. 2004. *Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: A World of Difference*. Oxford University Press. Chapters 4-6.\*

Esping-Anderson, Gosta. 1990. *Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chaps 1-3.\*

Carnes, Mathew and Isabela Mares. 2007. "[Social Policy in Developing Countries](#)" *Annual Review of Political Science*. 2009: 12:93-113

Rehm, Philip. 2009. "Risks and Redistribution: An Individual-Level Analysis." *Comparative Political Studies*. 42:7, 855-881.

Iverson, Torben and Frances Rosenbluth, 2010. *Women, Work, and Politics: The Political Economy of Gender Inequality*. New Haven: Yale University Press, chapters 1, 2, and 5.\*

#### **Recommended:**

Allan H. Meltzer and Scott F. Richard. 1981. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government." *Journal of Political Economy*. 89, 914-27.

Lake, David and Matthew Baum. 2001. "[The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services](#)," *Comparative Political Studies* 34: 587-621.

Bartels, Larry. 2010. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. Princeton University Press. [1-4](#).

Lupu, Noam and Jonas Pontusson. 2011. "[The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution](#)" *American Political Science Review*.

**Presentation Topic One:** What determines preferences over redistribution?

Swenson, Peter 1991. "Bringing Capital Back In, or Social Democracy Reconsidered." *World Politics* 43: 7, 513-544.

Denisova I, Eller M, Frye T, Zhuravskaya E. 2009. Who wants to revise privatization: the complementarity of institutions and market skills. *American Political Science Review*. 103(2):284--304

Mares, Isabela. 2001. *The Politics of Social Risk*, New York: Cambridge University Press, Chapter 2. C.

Iversen, T. and David Soskice. "An Asset Theory of Social Policy Preference" 2001. *American Political Science Review* vol.95, No.4: 875-893.

Shafer, Michael. 1994. *Winners and Losers: How Sectors Shape the Developmental Prospects of States* Cornell University Press, 1994 .

**Presentation Topic Two:** Under What conditions can private groups provide public goods for their members?

Paul Milgrom, et al. "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: the Law Merchant, Private Judges and the Champagne Fairs, *Economics and Politics* 1990:2 1-23. J

Dietz, T, E Ostrom, and PC Stern. "The struggle to govern the commons." *Science (AAAS)* 302, no. 5652 (2003): 1907.

Frye, Timothy. 2000. *Brokers and Bureaucrats: Building Market Institutions In Russia*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

**May 4. Practice Comprehensive Exam in Class**