

## Politics of Autocracy G8428

Monday 10:10-12:00  
Online  
Spring 2021

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Office hours: Monday 2:00-3, or by appointment.

### Overview

This course offers a survey of major themes in the study of autocracy and is designed to help you educate yourselves in the study of autocracy and develop the analytic skills need to conduct research at a high level.

The course is designed for Ph.D. students who are preparing to take comprehensive exams, but is open to other students as well. Ph.D. students preparing for comprehensive exams will be given preference over other students. The class works best with 15 students or less. If you are not a Ph.D. student, you should email me a short paragraph describing why you would like to take the class by January 24<sup>th</sup> at noon.

### Requirements and Evaluation:

1. **Participation in Seminar:** Students must be prepared each week to discuss the core readings. Students who are making any sort of presentation are not exempt from this requirement (30 percent).
2. **Research Design:** Each student will write a short paper (15-20 pages) that identifies a research question, explains why this question is important, and then proposes a strategy for answering the question. Feel free to conduct the data analysis as time and topic permits. (60 percent)
3. **Article review.** A short review of an article as if it was submitted for publication and you were a reviewer for an academic journal (10%).

### 1. Participation

A critical component of the course is lively discussion of the week's readings. You should be prepared to discuss each reading on the syllabus for each week. You have not really done the readings until you are able to succinctly restate the argument, describe the methodology, and identify some strengths and weaknesses of the work. In other words, reading the article once, or worse, skimming the abstract, the introduction and conclusion alone, will not be sufficient. We will discuss several strategies for reading articles to get the most out of them.

You should assess the logical consistency, clarity, and novelty of the theoretical argument. Does it produce new insights? Are the assumptions of the theory clear and reasonable? Is the logic of the theory internally consistent? Do the hypotheses flow logically from the theory? Does the theory generate hypotheses that could be tested, but are not? Does the theory suggest possible causal mechanisms?

You should also assess the evidence provided in support of the argument. Are the empirical tests convincing? Are the procedures used to assess the argument described adequately? Are the measures valid and reliable? Does the author consider multiple mechanisms which may link variables? Are other interpretations of the evidence more plausible? What of the possibility of reverse causality, omitted variable bias, selection bias, and endogeneity? How important are these problems? Can they be addressed? If so, how?

You should also consider the implications of the argument. Has the author made claims that extend beyond the evidence? Are the findings important? If so, for what? For substantive outcomes? For normative reasons? For social science? (Filling a hole in the literature is not always a reason to write an article. Some holes aren't worth filling.) Has the author convinced you that you should care about the finding? How does this work relate to similar work? To what related topics could the theory, evidence, or research design apply? Are there policy implications for the work?

Remember to consider strengths and weaknesses of the arguments. Be wary of the "graduate student disease." Symptoms include over the top criticism accompanied by an inability to recognize scholarly contributions.

The participation grade includes three components:

*Class Discussion.* You will be graded on the quality of your participation not just on the quantity. Making a few well thought out additions to the debate is much preferred to frequent, but shallow interventions. I love to cold call on students and I can assure you that each student will either speak of their own accord or be called upon to discuss a particular reading during each class.

*Presentation.* Each week, 25 minutes of the seminar will be devoted to presentations by students on questions that are posed on the syllabus. Other topics are also welcome. These presentations will be **10 minutes (no more)** each, and should use slides. We will then have discussions about the materials. In general, weak presentations will simply summarize the readings ("Smith says x, Jones says y"). Strong presentations will:

Describe any key conceptual issues that must be addressed by work on the question (e.g., a presentation on inequality might discuss different ways of conceptualizing inequality);

Describe the central arguments/debates in the literature on the question (e.g., a presentation on corruption might focus on different types of variables –such as regime type, decentralization, level of development -- that influence corruption levels);

Describe thorny methodological issues that bedevil work on the question (e.g., a presentation on social revolutions might discuss the problems created by the small-n nature

of the phenomenon).

Offer criticisms and/or suggest pathways for future research.

To help you get started, the syllabus lists "Suggested Readings." These might serve as a place to begin, but students must do their own bibliographic research. You should obviously not feel obligated to cover all of these suggested readings. You should post their presentations on the "Lecture" section of CourseWorks. You should also create a bibliography of the works you have consulted. This will then create a general resource that should be helpful in preparing for comprehensive exams.

*Reaction Comments.* Each week each student will post reaction comments on the course blog. These comments should not exceed a paragraph. The comments are due on Sunday at 6:00 PM. Be sure to read other posts before coming to class.

## **2. Research Design Essay**

The research design paper should be (15-20 pages) that identifies a research question, explains why this question is important, proposes a strategy for answering the question, and then discusses possible strengths and weaknesses of the proposal. A weak essay will simply do the above. A strong paper will propose a novel topic that sheds light on an important debate; identifies how and why this paper may make a contribution to the literature and propose a reasonable research strategy. A strong paper will also include a careful critique of the research design identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the proposal. This is a chance for you to begin to develop your own ideas for research even if you do not have time to actually collect the data necessary to assess the argument. Due before class on April 21. You can post it to Courseworks under assignment.

## **3. Article Review.**

You should write a review of any of the articles or books on the syllabus that must be circulated to the class prior to our meeting. E-mail is fine.

The review should have three components:

- Brief summation (one paragraph) of the main argument made by the author and the evidence provided.
- An evaluation and critique of the author's argument and evidence. Does the author provide a compelling reason for writing the article? Does the author's argument make sense? Why or why not? Does the evidence (if any) comport with his/her argument? Why or why not? Do you know of other evidence that undermines (or supports) the author's argument? Does one of the other readings for that day offer a perspective that is discordant with the perspective offered by the author? This section should constitute the lion's share of the paper.
- A recommendation (reject the manuscript, major revision, minor revision, publish as is) to the (fictitious) editor with your reasons for why you hold this view.

## **Zoom Etiquette**

Seminar will be conducted on-line over Zoom. Expect technical difficulties. I will open access to the class at least five minutes before our official start time. Please sign into the session a few minutes before we start. Classes will be recorded, but sharing is not allowed.

It is up to you whether or not turn on your video. It will make it a lot easier for me to get a sense of the class if your video is turned on, but I also respect privacy and recognize that being on video may be inconvenient. If so, please let me know. Whether or not students have their videos on, I will be sure to cold-call on students and expect that all students will take part in zoom polls, breakout sessions, and other activities during class.

Please keep your chat function turned off unless I tell you otherwise.

In general, keep your mute function on when you are not speaking to avoid background.

Practice active listening skills. If you are muted, please use nonverbal clues to let the speaker know that you have heard and that you do or do not understand. Often a simple “thumbs up” or “thumbs down” will be enough.

Please use the “raise hand” function in Zoom when you have a question.

Treat all digital course material with integrity just as you would printed course material. Never distribute the class sessions in whole or in part without explicit permission from me.

Be patient with connectivity issues. I know that they can be frustrating, but not everyone’s wifi connection will be working all the time.

## **Academic Integrity**

The intellectual venture in which we are all engaged requires of faculty and students alike the highest level of personal and academic integrity. As members of an academic community, each one of us bears the responsibility to participate in scholarly discourse and research in a manner characterized by intellectual honesty and scholarly integrity.

Scholarship, by its very nature, is an iterative process, with ideas and insights building one upon the other. Collaborative scholarship requires the study of other scholars' work, the free discussion of such work, and the explicit acknowledgement of those ideas in any work that inform our own. This exchange of ideas relies upon a mutual trust that sources, opinions, facts, and insights will be properly noted and carefully credited.

In practical terms, this means that, as students, you must be responsible for the full citations of others' ideas in all of your research papers and projects; you must be scrupulously honest when taking your examinations; you must always submit your own work and not that of another student, scholar, or internet agent.

Any breach of this intellectual responsibility is a breach of faith with the rest of our academic community. It undermines our shared intellectual culture, and it cannot be tolerated. Students failing to meet these responsibilities should anticipate being asked to leave Columbia.

All of the work you do in this course is expected to be your own. No cheating or plagiarism (using someone else's words or ideas without proper attribution). Any cases of cheating or plagiarism will be handled according to university policy and, when appropriate, reported to the university Committee on Academic Misconduct. If you have questions, please let me know.

There is a fine line between sloppy citations and punctuation and intentional plagiarism. It is your responsibility to learn and use proper attribution and citation. Be safe and determine in advance that you are being both ethical and orderly so as to avoid questionable work that could create an accusation of academic misconduct. You are responsible for asking questions about policies and about my expectations for your work. If you are not certain you are doing the right thing, please ask your TA or me.

You also are violating the Columbia academic integrity policy if you self-plagiarize, i.e. if you turn in for this course a paper that you already have written for another course. Although scholars do build on their early ideas as they advance their scholarship, I expect that written work you do for this course which you have written and submitted a paper for another course.”

Students should also read and follow the Columbia University Undergraduate Guide to Academic Integrity. <https://www.college.columbia.edu/academics/academicintegrity>

### **Disability Accommodations Student Rights and Responsibilities**

In order to ensure their rights to reasonable accommodations, it is the responsibility of students to report any learning-related disabilities, to do so in a timely fashion, and to do so through the Office of Disability Services. Students who have documented conditions and are determined by DS to need individualized services will be provided a DS-certified ‘Accommodation Letter’. It is students’ responsibility to provide this letter to all their instructors and in so doing request the stated accommodations.

**"If you are a student with a disability and have a DS-certified ‘Accommodation Letter’ please come to my office hours to confirm your accommodation needs. If you believe that you might have a disability that requires accommodation, you should contact Disability Services at 212-854-2388 and [disability@columbia.edu](mailto:disability@columbia.edu)."**

### Statement as a Responsible Employee

Columbia faculty are committed to helping create a safe learning environment for all students and for the university as a whole. If you have experienced any form of gender or sex-based discrimination or harassment, including sexual assault, sexual harassment, relationship violence, or stalking, know that help and support are available. Columbia has staff members trained to support survivors in navigating campus life, accessing health and counseling services, providing academic and housing accommodations, and more. The University strongly encourages all students to report any such incidents to the University. Please be aware that all Columbia employees (other than those designated as confidential resources such as advocates, counselors, clergy and healthcare providers) are required to report information about such discrimination and harassment to the University. This means that if you tell a faculty member about a situation of sexual harassment or sexual violence, or other related misconduct, the faculty member must share that information with the University's Title

IX Coordinator. If you wish to speak to a confidential employee who does not have this reporting responsibility, you can find a list of resources on the University Life webpage. See here <https://www.universitylife.columbia.edu/get-help-for-discrimination-harassment-more>

### **Teaching and Learning During a Global Pandemic**

We are all in uncharted waters this semester. We will all need to be more flexible and creative about how we approach teaching and learning than in past semesters. This may mean changes to the syllabus and experiments with different formats of activities during class time. Throughout the semester I will ask for feedback to try to evaluate what strategies are working best and adjust as needed.

Teaching and learning during a global pandemic will tax our strengths in many ways. We are all likely to experience greater ups and downs than in a typical semester. Columbia offers a great array of counseling and psychological services that are available to you should you need them. More information is here <https://health.columbia.edu/content/counseling-and-psychological-services> Should you find yourself struggling, it is important to reach out early. If your physical or mental state is affecting your work, please also inform me. Even with all the uncertainty and the challenges that we will face, I hope that you are as excited to take this course as I am to teach it.

### **Readings**

The readings emphasize more recent cutting-edge works, but the recommended works include many classics that you should read as well, even if we will not be able to give the time that they deserve in our short time together.

Many of the readings are available electronically through JSTOR or the Columbia Library. I will also try to put articles in the Files Folder in on Courseworks.

You should purchase the following works. If you can buy them through *Book Culture* at 536 W. 112th between Broadway and Amsterdam.

### **Books For Purchase**

- 1) Boix, Carles. *Redistribution and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- 2) Svobik, Milan. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- 3) Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, Erica Frantz, *How Dictatorships Work*. Cambridge University Press, 2018.
- 4) Truex, Rory. *Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern China*. Cambridge University Press.
- 5) Blyden, Lisa. *State of Repression: Iraq Under Sadaam Hussein*. Princeton University Press, 2020.

6) Meng, Anne *Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes*. Cambridge University Press, 2020.

7) Rosenfeld, Bryn 2020. *The Autocratic Middle Class: How State Dependency Reduces the Demand for Democracy*, Princeton University Press, 2020.

### **January 11. Week 1. Introduction and Thinking about Thinking**

Heath, Chip and Stan Heath. *Made To Stick*. Intro, Chapters 1, 4, 6 and Epilogue.

Huber, John. 2013. "Is Theory Getting Lost in the Identification Revolution?" ms.

Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What Do We Know About Democratization after 20 Years." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2.

Gehlbach, Scott, Konstantin Sonin, and Milan Svobik. "Formal Models of Non-Democratic Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science*.

Recommended:

Mike Munger, Scholars Talk Writing <https://www.chronicle.com/article/scholars-talk-writing-michael-c-munger/>

Van Oech. Roger *A Whack on the Side of the Head*. Warner Books. Third Edition

Lehrer, John. 2008. "Eureka" *New Yorker*.

### **January 18. Week 2. No Class. Martin Luther King Day**

### **January 25. Week 3. Concepts, Typology and Research Design**

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, 2018. *How Dictatorships Work*, Cambridge University Press.

Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*, Cambridge University Press, 3-38.

Scott, James. *Seeing Like A State*. Yale University Press, 1-83.

Paxton, Pamela. 2000. "Women's Suffrage in the Measurement of Democracy." *Problems of Operationalization*." *Studies in Comparative International Development*. 35:3, 92-111.

Friedrich, Carl J., and Zbigniew Brzezinski. 1956. *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pp. 15-26, 47-57, 71-80.

Recommended:

Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge. Chapters 1-2.

Haber, Stephen. "Authoritarian Government." 2006. In eds. Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*.

Linz, Juan J. 2000. *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Chapters 1 and 2.

"Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited," 2009. Cheibub, Jose, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Vreeland. *Public Choice*.

Robert Dahl. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chapter 1.

Sen, Amartya. 1999. "Democracy as a Universal Value" *Journal of Democracy*. 10, 3. Pp. 3-17.

Wintrobe, Ronald. 1990. The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship." *American Political Science Review*. 84(3):849-872.

Goemans. Hein, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Giacomo Chiazzi. 2009. "Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders," *Journal of Peace Research*. 46:2, 269-283.

Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market*. New York: Cambridge pg. 10-40.

## **February 1. Week 4. Power and Power Sharing**

Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press.

Anne Meng, 2020. *Constraining Dictatorship: From Personalized Rule to Institutionalized Regimes*.

Pepinsky, Thomas. 2013. "The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism." *British Journal of Political Science*. 44:3, 631-653.

Recommended:

Havel, Vaclav. "The Power of the Powerless." In Vaclav Havel, *Open Letters: Selected Writings, 1965-1990*. New York: Vintage Books.



Myerson, Roger. 2008. The Autocrat's Credibility Problem. *American Political Science Review*. 102:1, 125-139.

Magaloni, Beatriz, and Ruth Kricheli, 'Political Order and One-Party Rule', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 13 (2010): 123-43.

## **February 8. Week 5. Transitions in and out of autocracy**

Boix, Carles. *Redistribution and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, 1-131, 233-240.

Geddes, Barbara, 2007. "What Causes Democratization?" In eds. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes. *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. 317-339.

Ansell, Ben W. and David J. Samuel. 2014. *Inequality and Democratization: An Elite Competition Approach*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 3-5.

Seva Gunitsky "From Shocks to Waves: Hegemonic Transitions and Democratization," *International Organization*, 2014, 68:3, 561-97.

### Recommended:

Londregan, John, and Keith Poole. 1990. "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power." *World Politics*. 42(2):151-183.

Powell, Jonathan. 2012. "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'Etat." 2012. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 56(6).

Buena de Mesquita, Bruce and Alistair Smith. 2009. Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change." *Comparative Political Studies*. 42:2, 167-197.

Brownlee, Jason. 2007. "Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies," *World Politics* 59(4): 595-638.

Moore, Barrington. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Beacon Press. 1966.

Menaldo, Victor. 2012. "The Middle East and North Africa's Resilient Monarchs," *Journal of Politics*. 74.3

Bunce, Valerie, and Sharon L. Wolchik. 2011. *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

## **February 15. Week 6. Repression and Coercion**

Sheena Greitens. 2016. *Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence*. Cambridge University Press. Selections.

Lisa Blaydes, *States of Repression: Iraq Under Sadaam Hussein*, 1-60, 163-236.

Guriey, Sergei, and Daniel Treisman. 2019. "Informational Autocrats." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 33 (4): 100-127.

Khlevniuk, Oleg. 1995. "The Objectives of the Great Terror, 1937-1938," in Hoffmann, David. *Stalinism. Essential Readings*.

Recommended:

Klor, Establan, Sebastian Seigh, Satyanath Shanker, 2016. "Crony Capitalism and the Targeting of Violence: Labor Repression During Argentina's Last Dictatorship."

Gregory, Paul R., Philipp J. H. Schroder, and Konstantin Sonin. 2011. "Rational Dictators and the Killing of Innocents: Data from Stalin's Archives." *Journal of Comparative Economics*. 39(1):34-2.

Bellin. Eva. 2005. "Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders," in Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michelle Penner Angrist (eds.), *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, pp. 21-41

Allen, William Sheridan. *The Nazi Seizure of Power. The Experience of a Single German Town, 1922-1945*. New York: Watts. Part 2.

Buena de Mesquita, Ethan. 2010. "Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs." *American Political Science Review*. 104:3, 446-466.

Kung, James Kai-Sing and Shuo Chen. 2011. "The Tragedy of the Nomenklatura: Career Incentives and Political Radicalism during China's Great Leap Famine." *American Political Science Review*.

Albertus, Michael and Victor Menaldo. 2012. "Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratization." *Comparative Politics*.44:2, 151-169.

## **February 22. Week 7. Accountability and Responsiveness**

Weeks, Jessica L. 2008. "Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve." *International Organization* 62:1, 35-64.

Chen, Jidong, Jennifer Pan, and Yiging Xu. 2016. "Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China." *American Journal of Political Science*, 60:2, 383-400.

Ross, Michael. 2008. "Oil, Islam and Women," *American Political Science Review*. 102(1): 107-123.

Recommended

“Symposium: A Comparative Politics of Gender.” *Perspectives on Politics* 8:1, 159-240. Especially 159-169.

Goemans, Hein and Alexandre Debs. 2010. “Regime Type, The Fate of Leaders and War.” *American Political Science Review*, Volume 104, No. 3 (August), pp.430-446.

Hollyer, James R, B. Peter Rosendorff, and James R. Vreeland. 2015. “Transparency Protest and Autocratic Instability.” 2011. *American Political Science Review*. 109:4, 764-784.

Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2006. “Tipping Games: When Do Opposition Parties Coalesce” In Schedler, Andreas. *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce et al. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. MIT Press, Cambridge.

Ghandi, Jennifer and Ellen Lust. 2009. “Elections Under Authoritarianism.” *Annual Review of Political Science*. 12, 403-422.

Simpser, Alberto. 2013. *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 4, 5.

Pop-Eleches, Grigore and Graeme Robertson. 2015. “Elections, Information, and Political Change in the Post-Cold War Era.” *Comparative Politics*

Svolik, Milan and Ashlea Rundlett. 2016. “Deliver the Vote: Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud” *American Political Science Review*.

Mares, Isabela and Lauren Young. 2016. “Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes.” *Annual Review of Political Science*.

Little, Andrew, Joshua Tucker, and Tom Lagatta. 2015. “Elections, Protest and Alternations of Power.” *Journal of Politics*

### **March 1. Week 8. Spring Break**

### **March 8. Week 9. Mobilization and Protest**

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy. The Politics of Party Hegemony and its Demise*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-3.

Frye, Timothy, John Reuter, David Szakonyi. 2014. “Political Machines at Work: Workplace Mobilization and Electoral Subversion.” *World Politics*.

Lorentzen, Peter. 2013. “Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian Regime.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 8(2):127-158.

Kuran, Timur 1991. "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolutions of 1989." *World Politics* 44:1, 7-48.

Recommended:

Frye, Timothy and Ekaterina Borisova. 2017. "Elections Protest, and Trust in Government: A Natural Experiment From Russia." Manuscript.

Susanne Lohmann 1994. "Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany 1989-91." *World Politics*, October.

Beissinger, Mark. 2007. "Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions." *Perspectives on Politics*. 5(2):259-276.

### **March 15. Week 10. Cooptation**

Truex, Rory. *Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern China*. Cambridge University Press.

Malesky, Edmund and Paul Schuler. 2011. "Noodling or Needling Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament." *American Political Science Review*. 104:3, 482-502.

Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski. 2006. "Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships." *Economics and Politics*.

Shih, Victor, Christopher Adolph, and Mingxing Liu. 2012. "Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China." *American Political Science Review*

Recommended:

Brownlee, Jason. 2007. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-3.

Besley, Timothy and Masayuki Kudamatsu. 2008. Making Autocracy Work. In *Institutions and Economic Performance*, edited by Elhanan Helpman (Harvard University Press), 452-510.

### **March 22. Week 11. Public Opinion and Society**

Bryn Rosenfeld, *The Autocratic Middle Class: How State Dependency Reduces the Demand for Democracy*, Princeton University Press, 2020.

Geddes, Barbara and John Zaller. 1989. "Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science* 33(2): 319-347.

Frye, Timothy, Scott Gehlbach, Kyle Marquart, Ora John Reuter 2016. "Is Putin's Popularity Real?" *Post-Soviet Affairs*.

King, Pan, and Roberts King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. 2013. "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression." *American Political Science Review*. 107(02), 326-343.

Wedeen, Lisa. 1998. "Acting 'As If': Symbolic Politics and Social Control in Syria," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 40(3): 503-523.

### **Recommended:**

Sunn Buss, Sarah, Aaron Erlich, Lauren Prather and Yael Zeira. "The Effects of Authoritarian Iconography: An Empirical Test." *Comparative Political Studies*. 49:13, 1704-1738.

Alexis Lerner, "The Cooptation of Dissent in A Hybrid-Regime: Post-Soviet Graffiti in Moscow," *Comparative Political Studies*, 2020.

### **March 29. Week 12. Economic Policy and Development**

Yuhua Wang, *Tying the Autocrat's Hands: The Rise of the Rule of Law in China*. Cambridge University Press.

Scott Gehlbach and Phil Keefer. 2011. "Investment without Democracy: Ruling-Party Institutionalization and Credible Commitment in Autocracies." *Journal of Comparative Economics*. 39(2):123-139.

Wright, Joseph. 2008. "Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment?" *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (2):322-43.

Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." *American Political Science Review* 87 (3): 567-576.

### **Recommended:**

Blaydes, Lisa. 2013. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chaps 1-8.

Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 2002. "Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development among New World Economies" *Economia*, Fall 2002. 41-109. [D2L]

Xu, Chenggang. 2011. "The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development." *Journal of Economic Literature*.

Albertus, Michael. 2015. *Autocracy and Redistribution: The Politics of Land Reform*. Cambridge University Press.

Haber, Stephen et al. 2003. *The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929*. Cambridge University Press.

Helmke, Gretchen. 2002. "The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court Executive Relations in Argentina under Dictatorship and Democracy." *American Journal of Political Science*.

Hollyer, James and Leonard Wantchekon. 2015. "Corruption and Ideology in Autocracies." *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*. 31:3, 499-533.

Ginsburg, Thomas and Alberto Simpser (eds). 2013. *Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes*. New York: Cambridge. [Selections]

Ginsburg, Thomas and Tamir Moustafa. 2008. *Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes*. New York: Cambridge. [Selections]

Yadav, Vineeta and Bumba Mukherjee. 2016. *The Politics of Corruption in Dictatorships*. Cambridge University Press.

#### **April 5. Media and Information**

Egorov, Georgy, Sergei Guriev and Konstantin Sonin 2009. "Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data," *American Political Science Review*, 103:4, 645-668.

King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. 2013. "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression." *American Political Science Review*. 107(2):326-343.

Lorentzen, Peter. 2014. "China's Strategic Censorship." *American Journal of Political Science*. 58(2):402-414.

Arturas Rozenas and Denis Stukal "How Autocrats Manipulate News: Evidence from Russia's State Controlled Television," *Journal of Politics*, 81:3,

John McMillan and Pablo Zoido. "[How To Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru.](#)" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 2004. 18:4, 69-92.

#### **Recommended:**

Kapuscinsky, Ryszard. 1989. *The Emperor: Downfall of an Autocrat*. New York: Vintage

Seva Gunitsky, 2015. "Corrupting the Cyber Commons," *Perspectives on Politics*, 13:1.

## April 12. Researching Autocracy

Gaventa, John. 1982. *Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley*. [Selections]

Sperling, Valerie. *Sex Politics, and Putin*. New York; Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1, 2 and conclusion.

Hutchcroft, Paul D. "Oligarchs and Cronies in the Philippine State: The Politics of Patrimonial Plunder." *World Politics*. 43(3):414-50.

## Additional Readings

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