

Politics of Autocracy G8428

Monday 10:10-12:00

713 IAB

Spring 2017

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Office hours: M 3-4, W, 2-3, or by appointment.

Overview

This course offers a survey of major themes in the study of autocracy and is designed to help you educate yourselves in the study of autocracy and develop the analytic skills need to conduct research at a high level.

The course is designed for Ph.D. students who are preparing to take comprehensive exams, but is open to other students as well. Ph.D. students preparing for comprehensive exams will be given preference over other students. The class works best with 15 students or less. If you are not a Ph.D. student, you should email me a short paragraph describing why you would like to take the class by January 24th at noon.

Requirements and Evaluation:

1. **Participation in Seminar:** Students must be prepared each week to discuss the core readings. Students who are making any sort of presentation are not exempt from this requirement (30 percent).
2. **Research Design:** Each student will write a short paper (15-20 pages) that identifies a research question, explains why this question is important, and then proposes a strategy for answering the question. Feel free to conduct the data analysis as time and topic permits. (60 percent)
3. **Article review.** A short review of an article as if it was submitted for publication and you were a reviewer for an academic journal (10%).

1. Participation

A critical component of the course is lively discussion of the week's readings. You should be prepared to discuss each reading on the syllabus for each week. You have not really done the readings until you are able to succinctly restate the argument, describe the methodology, and identify some strengths and weaknesses of the work. In other words, reading the article once, or worse, skimming the abstract, the introduction and conclusion alone, will not be sufficient. We will discuss several strategies for reading articles to get the most out of them.

You should assess the logical consistency, clarity, and novelty of the theoretical argument. Does it produce new insights? Are the assumptions of the theory clear and reasonable? Is the logic of the theory internally consistent? Do the hypotheses flow logically from the theory? Does the theory

generate hypotheses that could be tested, but are not? Does the theory suggest possible causal mechanisms?

You should also assess the evidence provided in support of the argument. Are the empirical tests convincing? Are the procedures used to assess the argument described adequately? Are the measures valid and reliable? Does the author consider multiple mechanisms which may link variables? Are other interpretations of the evidence more plausible? What of the possibility of reverse causality, omitted variable bias, selection bias, and endogeneity? How important are these problems? Can they be addressed? If so, how?

You should also consider the implications of the argument. Has the author made claims that extend beyond the evidence? Are the findings important? If so, for what? For substantive outcomes? For normative reasons? For social science? (Filling a hole in the literature is not always a reason to write an article. Some holes aren't worth filling.) Has the author convinced you that you should care about the finding? How does this work relate to similar work? To what related topics could the theory, evidence, or research design apply? Are there policy implications for the work?

Remember to consider strengths and weaknesses of the arguments. Be wary of the "graduate student disease." Symptoms include over the top criticism accompanied by an inability to recognize scholarly contributions.

The participation grade includes three components:

Class Discussion. You will be graded on the quality of your participation not just on the quantity. Making a few well thought out additions to the debate is much preferred to frequent, but shallow interventions. I love to cold call on students and I can assure you that each student will either speak of their own accord or be called upon to discuss a particular reading.

Presentation. Each week, 20 minutes of the seminar will be devoted to presentations by students on questions that are posed on the syllabus. Other topics are also welcome. These presentations will be **10 minutes (no more)** each, and should use slides. We will then have discussions about the materials. In general, weak presentations will simply summarize the readings ("Smith says x, Jones says y"). Strong presentations will:

Describe any key conceptual issues that must be addressed by work on the question (e.g., a presentation on inequality might discuss different ways of conceptualizing inequality);

Describe the central arguments/debates in the literature on the question (e.g., a presentation on corruption might focus on different types of variables –such as regime type, decentralization, level of development -- that influence corruption levels);

Describe thorny methodological issues that bedevil work on the question (e.g., a presentation on social revolutions might discuss the problems created by the small-n nature of the phenomenon).

Offer criticisms and/or suggest pathways for future research.

To help you get started, the syllabus lists "Suggested Readings." These might serve as a place to begin, but students must do their own bibliographic research. You should obviously not feel obligated to cover all of these suggested readings. You should post their presentations on the "Lecture" section of CourseWorks. You should also create a bibliography of the works you have consulted. This will then create a general resource that should be helpful in preparing for comprehensive exams.

Reaction Comments. Each week each student will post reaction comments on the course blog. These comments should not exceed a paragraph. The comments are due on Sunday at 6:00 PM. Be sure to read other posts before coming to class.

2. Research Design Essay

The research design paper should be (15-20 pages) that identifies a research question, explains why this question is important, proposes a strategy for answering the question, and then discusses possible strengths and weaknesses of the proposal. A weak essay will simply do the above. A strong paper will propose a novel topic that sheds light on an important debate; identifies how and why this paper may make a contribution to the literature and propose a reasonable research strategy. A strong paper will also include a careful critique of the research design identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the proposal. This is a chance for you to begin to develop your own ideas for research even if you do not have time to actually collect the data necessary to assess the argument. Due before class on April 21. You can post it to Courseworks under assignment.

3. Article Review.

You should write a review of any of the articles or books on the syllabus that must be circulated to the class prior to our meeting. E-mail is fine.

The review should have three components:

- Brief summation (one paragraph) of the main argument made by the author and the evidence provided.
- An evaluation and critique of the author's argument and evidence. Does the author's argument make sense? Why or why not? Does the evidence (if any) comport with his/her argument? Why or why not? Do you know of other evidence that undermines (or supports) the author's argument? Does one of the other readings for that day offer a perspective that is discordant with the perspective offered by the author? This section should constitute the lion's share of the paper.
- A recommendation (reject the manuscript, major revision, minor revision, publish as is) to the (fictitious) editor with your reasons for why you hold this view.

Materials

Most works are available from JSTOR or the Columbia Electronic Library. I will also post works on the Courseworks website that are not easily available electronically. Many are also available via Google and other electronic sources. The readings may change in some weeks based on student interest.

Required Reading available through Book Culture 536 W. 112th between Broadway and Amsterdam.

- 1) Boix, Carles. *Redistribution and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.
- 2) Svobik, Milan. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press.
- 3) Truex, Rory. *Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern China*. Cambridge University Press.
- 4) Blaydes, Lisa. 2013. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. Cambridge University Press.
- 5) Simpser, Alberto. 2013. *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

January 23 Week 1. Introduction and Thinking about Thinking

Haber, Stephen. "Authoritarian Government." 2006. In eds. Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*.

Huber, John. 2013. "Is Theory Getting Lost in the Identification Revolution?" ms. <http://themonkeycage.org/2013/06/14/is-theory-getting-lost-in-the-identification-revolution/>

Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What Do We Know About Democratization after 20 Years." *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2.

Heath, Chip and Stan Heath. *Made To Stick*. Intro, [Chapters 1, 4, 6 and Epilogue](#).

Recommended:

Van Oech. Roger *A Whack on the Side of the Head*. Warner Books. Third Edition http://courses.washington.edu/art166sp/documents/Spring2012/readings/week_3/AWhackOnTheSideOfTheHead.pdf

Lehrer, John. 2008. "Eureka" *New Yorker*.

January 30. Concepts.

Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Pp. 3-38.

Gehlbach, Scott, Konstantin Sonin, and Milan Svobik. "Formal Models of Non-Democratic Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science*. <http://scottgehlbach.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Gehlbach-Sonin-Svobik-ARPS.pdf>

Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge. Chapters 1-2.

Paxton, Pamela. 2000. "Women's Suffrage in the Measurement of Democracy." *Problems of Operationalization*." *Studies in Comparative International Development*. 35:3, 92-111.

Friedrich, Carl J., and Zbigniew Brzezinski. 1956. *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pp. 15-26, 47-57, 71-80.

Recommended:

Linz, Juan J. 2000. *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. Chapters 1 and 2.

"Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited" 2009. Cheibub, Jose, Jennifer Gandhi, and James Vreeland. *Public Choice*.

Robert Dahl. 1971. *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New Haven: Yale University Press. Chapter 1.

Sen, Amartya. 1999. "Democracy as a Universal Value" *Journal of Democracy*. 10, 3. Pp. 3-17.

Wintrobe, Ronald. 1990. The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship." *American Political Science Review*. 84(3):849-872.

Goemans, Hein, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Giacomo Chiazzi. 2009. "Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders," *Journal of Peace Research*. 46:2, 269-283.

Przeworski, Adam. 1991. *Democracy and the Market*. New York: Cambridge pg. 10-40.

February 6. Power and Power Sharing

Svolik, Milan. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press.

Pepinsky, Thomas. 2013. "The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism." *British Journal of Political Science*. 44:3, 631-653.

Magaloni, Beatriz, and Ruth Kricheli, 'Political Order and One Party Rule', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 13 (2010): 123-43.

Recommended:

Havel, Vaclav. "The Power of the Powerless." In Vaclav Havel, *Open Letters: Selected Writings, 1965-1990*. New York: Vintage Books.

Myerson, Roger. 2008. The Autocrat's Credibility Problem. *American Political Science Review*. 102:1, 125-139.

February 13. March 20. Transitions in and out of autocracy

Boix, Carles. *Redistribution and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, 1-131, 233-240.

Londregan, John, and Keith Poole. 1990. "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power." *World Politics*. 42(2):151-183.

Geddes, Barbara, 2007. "What Causes Democratization?" In eds. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes. *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. 317-339.

Ansell, Ben W. and David J. Samuel. 2014. *Inequality and Democratization: An Elite Competition Approach*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 3-5.

Recommended:

Powell, Jonathan. 2012. "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'Etat." 2012. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. 56(6).

Buena de Mesquita, Bruce and Alistair Smith. 2009. Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change." *Comparative Political Studies*. 42:2, 167-197.

Brownlee, Jason. 2007. "Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies," *World Politics* 59(4): 595-638.

Moore, Barrington. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Beacon Press. 1966.

Menaldo, Victor. 2012. "The Middle East and North Africa's Resilient Monarchs" *Journal of Politics*. 74.3

Bunce, Valerie, and Sharon L. Wolchik. 2011. *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

February 20. Repression and Coercion

Greteins, Sheena. 2016. *Dictators and Their Secret Police: Coercive Institutions and State Violence*. Cambridge University Press. Selections.

Buena de Mesquita, Ethan. 2010. "Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs." *American Political Science Review*. 104:3, 446-466.

Kung, James Kai-Sing and Shuo Chen. 2011. "The Tragedy of the Nomenklatura: Career Incentives and Political Radicalism during China's Great Leap Famine" *American Political Science Review*.

Albertus, Michael and Victor Menaldo. 2012. "Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratization." *Comparative Politics*.44:2, 151-169.

Khlevniuk, Oleg. 1995. "The Objectives of the Great Terror, 1937-1938," in Hoffmann, David. *Stalinism. Essential Readings*. [D2L]

Recommended:

Klor, Establan, Sebastian Seign Satyanath Shanker, 2016. "Crony Capitalism and the Targeting of Violence: Labor Repression During Argentina's Last Dictatorship."

Gregory, Paul R., Philipp J. H. Schroder, and Konstantin Sonin. 2011. "Rational Dictators and the Killing of Innocents: Data from Stalin's Archives." *Journal of Comparative Economics*. 39(1):34-2.

Bellin, Eva. 2005. "Coercive Institutions and Coercive Leaders," in Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michelle Penner Angrist (eds.), *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance*, pp. 21-41

Allen, William Sheridan. *The Nazi Seizure of Power. The Experience of a Single German Town, 1922-1945*. New York: Watts. Part 2.

February 27. Accountability

Weeks, Jessica L. 2008. "Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signalling Resolve." *International Organization* 62:1, 35-64.

Chen, Jidong, Jennifer Pan, and Yiging Xu. 2016. "Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China." *American Journal of Political Science*, 60:2, 383-400.

Hollyer, James R, B. Peter Rosendorff, and James R. Vreeland. 2015. "Transparency Protest and Autocratic Instability." 2011. *American Political Science Review*. 109:4, 764-784.

Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2006. "Tipping Games: When Do Opposition Parties Coalesce" In Schedler, Andreas. *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce et al. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. MIT Press, Cambridge. Selections.

Recommended:

"Symposium: A Comparative Politics of Gender." *Perspectives on Politics* 8:1, 159-240. Especially 159-169.

Goemans, Hein and Alexandre Debs. 2010. "Regime Type, The Fate of Leaders and War." *American Political Science Review*, Volume 104, No. 3 (August), pp.430-446.

March 6. Elections

Ghandi, Jennifer and Ellen Lust. 2009. "Elections Under Authoritarianism." *Annual Review of Political Science*. 12, 403-422.

Simpser, Alberto. 2013. *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 4, 5.

Pop-Eleches, Grigore and Graeme Robertson. 2015. "Elections, Information, and Political Change in the Post-Cold War Era." *Comparative Politics*

Svolik, Milan and Ashlea Rundlett. 2016. "Deliver the Vote: Micromotives and Macrobehavior in Electoral Fraud" *American Political Science Review*.

Mares, Isabela and Lauren Young. 2016. "Buying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes." *Annual Review of Political Science*.

Recommended:

Little, Andrew, Joshua Tucker, and Tom Lagatta. 2015. Elections, Protest and Alternations of Power." *Journal of Politics*

March 13 Spring Break.

March 20. Mobilization and Protest

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy. The Politics of Party Hegemony and its Demise*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-3.

Frye, Timothy, John Reuter, David Szakonyi. 2014. "Political Machines at Work: Workplace Mobilization and Electoral Subversion." *World Politics*.

Lorentzen, Peter. 2013. "Regularizing Rioting: Permitting Public Protest in an Authoritarian Regime." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 8(2):127-158.

Kuran, Timur 1991. "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolutions of 1989." *World Politics* 44:1, 7-48.

Recommended:

Frye, Timothy and Ekaterina Borisova. 2017. "Elections Protest, and Trust in Government: A Natural Experiment From Russia." Manuscript.

Susanne Lohmann 1994. "Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany 1989-91." *World Politics*, October.

Beissinger, Mark. 2007. "Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions." *Perspectives on Politics*. 5(2):259-276.

March 27. Cooptation

Truex, Rory. *Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern China*. Cambridge University Press.

Malesky, Edmund and Paul Schuler. 2011. "Noodling or Needling Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament." *American Political Science Review*. 104:3, 482-502.

Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski. 2006. "Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships." *Economics and Politics*

Besley, Timothy and Masayuki Kudamatsu. 2008. Making Autocracy Work. In *Institutions and Economic Performance*, edited by Elhanan Helpman (Harvard University Press), 452-510.

Shih, Victor, Christopher Adolph, and Mingxing Liu. 2012. "Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China." *American Political Science Review*

Recommended:

Brownlee, Jason. 2007. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-3.

April 3. Public Opinion

Geddes, Barbara and John Zaller. 1989. "Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science* 33(2): 319-347.

Frye, Timothy, Scott Gehlbach, Kyle Marquardt, Ora John Reuter 2016. "Is Putin's Popularity Real?" *Post-Soviet Affairs*.

King, Pan, and Roberts King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. 2013. "How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression." *American Political Science Review*. 107(02), 326-343.

Wedeen, Lisa. 1998. "Acting 'As If': Symbolic Politics and Social Control in Syria," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 40(3): 503-523.

Egorov, Georgy, Sergei Guriev, and Konstantin Sonin. 2009. "Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data." *American Political Science Review*. 103(4):645-668.

Recommended:

Sunn Buss, Sarah, Aaron Erluch, Lauren Prather and Yael Zeira. "The Effects of Authoritarian Iconography: An Empirical Test." *Comparative Political Studies*. 49:13, 1704-1738.

April 10. Economic Policy and Development

Blaydes, Lisa. 2013. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chaps 1-8.

Scott Gehlbach and Phil Keefer. 2011. "Investment without Democracy: Ruling-Party Institutionalization and Credible Commitment in Autocracies." *Journal of Comparative Economics*. 39(2):123-139.

Wright, Joseph. 2008. "Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment?" *American Journal of Political Science* 52 (2):322-43.

Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." *American Political Science Review* 87 (3): 567-576.

Recommended:

Stanley L. Engerman and Kenneth L. Sokoloff. 2002. "Factor Endowments, Inequality, and Paths of Development among New World Economies" *Economia*, Fall 2002. 41-109. [D2L]

Xu, Chenggang. 2011. "The Fundamental Institutions of China's Reforms and Development." *Journal of Economic Literature*.

April 17. Rule of Law and Corruption

Yuhua Wang, *Tying the Autocrat's Hands: The Rise of the Rule of Law in China*. Cambridge University Press.

Albertus, Michael. 2015. *Autocracy and Redistribution: The Politics of Land Reform*. Cambridge University Press.

Haber, Stephen et al. 2003. *The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929*. Cambridge University Press.

Helmke, Gretchen. 2002. "The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court Executive Relations in Argentina under Dictatorship and Democracy." *American Journal of Political Science*.

Hollyer, James and Leonard Wantchekon. 2015. "Corruption and Ideology in Autocracies." *Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*. 31:3, 499-533.

Recommended:

Ginsburg, Thomas and Alberto Simpser (eds). 2013. *Constitutions in Authoritarian Regimes*. New York: Cambridge. [Selections]

Ginsburg, Thomas and Tamir Moustafa. 2008. *Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes*. New York: Cambridge. [Selections]

Yadav, Vineeta and Bumba Mukherjee. 2016. *The Politics of Corruption in Dictatorships*. Cambridge University Press.

April 24. Leadership

Besley, Timothy. 2005. "Political Selection." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 19(3): 43-60

Jones, Benjamin F., and Benjamin A. Olken. 2006. "Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth Since World War II." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. 120(3):835-864.

Sperling, Valerie. *Sex Politics, and Putin*. New York; Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1, 2 and conclusion.

Scott, James. *Seeing Like A State*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1-83.

Recommended:

Kapuschinsky, Ryszard. 1989. *The Emperor: Downfall of an Autocrat*. New York: Vintage

May 1. Researching Autocracy

Gaventa, John. 1982. *Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley*. [Selections]

Hutchcroft, Paul D. "Oligarchs and Cronies in the Philippine State: The Politics of Patrimonial Plunder." *World Politics*. 43(3):414-50.

Robison, Richard. "Authoritarian States, Capital-Ownning Classes, and the Politics of Newly Industrializing Countries: The Case of Indonesia." *World Politics*. 41(1):42-74.

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright and Erica Frantz. "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: a New Data Set." *Perspectives on Politics*, June. 12:2.

Ross, Michael. 2008. "Oil, Islam and Women" *American Political Science Review*. 102(1): 107-123.

Additional Readings

Macartan Humphreys, Jeffrey D. Sachs, and Joseph E. Stiglitz, "[Introduction](#)" What Is the Problem with Natural Resource Wealth?, 1-20.

Haber, Stephen and Victor Menaldo, 2011. "[Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse](#)," *American Political Science Review*. Feb. 1-26.

Ross, Stephen and Jørgen Juel Andersen 2011. "[Making the Resource Curse Disappear: A re-examination of Haber and Menaldo's "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism?"](#)" Draft: September 30, 2011.

Dunning, Thad. 2008. *Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes* (Cambridge University Press. [1-36. 107-146.](#)

Egorov G, Guriev S, Sonin K. 2009. "[Why resource poor dictators allow freer media: a theory and evidence from panel data.](#)" (have to be logged in to CU to see link) *American Political Science Review* 103(4):645--68

Tsui, Kevin. "More Oil, Less Democracy: Evidence from Worldwide Crude Oil Discoveries." Ms. Clemson University, January 20, 2009

Sachs, J. and A. M. Warner. 1995. "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth." NBER Working Paper No. 5398.

Sachs, J. and A. M. Warner. 2001. "The Curse of Natural Resources." *European Economic Review* 45(4-6): 827-38.

Robinson, James A., Ragnar Torvik, and Thierry Verdier. 2006. The Political Foundations of the Resource Curse. *Journal of Development Economics* 79: 2 , 447-468

Ross, Michael, 2009. "Oil and Democracy Revisited, ms. UCLA. 1-50.

John McMillan and Pablo Zoido. "[How To Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru.](#)" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 2004. 18:4, 69-92. [JSTOR.] Also available electronically via the library.

Satyanath. Shanker, Nico Voigtlander and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2013. "Bowling for Fascism: Social Capital and the Rise of the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany, 1919-33." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 19201. 1-46.

Ross, Michael. 2008. "Oil, Islam and Women" *American Political Science Review*. 102(1): 107-12.

Ross, Michael. 2001. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics*.

Haber, Stephen and Victor Menaldo. 2010. "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? a Reappraisal of the Resource Curse" *American Political Science Review*. 105(1).

Ross, Michael and Jorgen Juel Andersen. 2014. "The Big Oil Change: A Closer Look at the Haber-Menaldo Analysis" *Comparative Political Studies*

Leeman, Lucas and Isabela Mares. (Forthcoming). "From Open Secrets to the Secret Ballot: The Economic and Political Determinants of Secret Ballot Reform." *Journal of Politics*.

Kuran, Timur 1991. "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolutions of 1989. *World Politics* 44:1, 7-48. J.

Beissinger, Mark. 2007. "Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions." *Perspectives on Politics*. 5(2):259-276.

Slater, Dan. 2010. *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, Benjamin. 2005. "Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single-Party Rule." *World Politics*. 57(3):421-451.

Dunning, Thad. 2008. *Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Radnitz, Scott. 2010. *Weapons of the Wealthy*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Robertson, Graeme. 2011. *The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes: Managing Dissent in Post-Communist Russia*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Kapuschinski, Ryszard. 1983. *The Emperor: Downfall of an Autocrat*.

Fukuyama, Francis. 1989. "The End of History?" *National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989) Article can be accessed here <http://www.wesjones.com/eoh.htm>

Hale, Henry. 2005. "Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Eurasia." *World Politics*. 58(1): 133-165.

Enikolopov, Ruben, Vasily Korovkin, Maria Petrova, Konstantin Sonin, and Alexei Zakharov. 2013. "Field Experiment Estimate of Electoral Fraud in Russian Parliamentary Elections" *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 110(2).