

Comparative Politics Survey II G6412

Tuesday 2:10-4:00
711 IAB
Spring 2019

Professor Timothy Frye
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713 International Affairs Building
Office hours: T. 11-12 or by appt.

Overview

G6412 is one of two survey courses in comparative politics offered by the Political Science Department. The two courses complement each other, but need not be taken in any particular order. The course includes a great deal of student involvement and is designed to help you educate yourselves about the major themes in comparative politics and develop the analytic skills need to conduct research at a high level.

The course is designed for Ph.D. students who are preparing to take comprehensive exams, but is open to other students as well. Ph.D. students preparing for comprehensive exams will be given preference over other students. The class works best with 16 students or less.

If the course is overenrolled, you should email me a short paragraph describing why you would like to take the class by January 24th at noon. I will make admission decisions and inform you by the end of the day on January 25th.

Requirements and Evaluation:

1. **Participation in Seminar:** Students must be prepared each week to discuss the core readings. (25 percent).
2. **Research Design Paper:** Each student will write a short paper (15 pages or so) that identifies a research question, explains why this question is important, and then proposes a strategy for answering the question. Feel free to conduct the data analysis as time and topic permits. (35 percent) Due April 2nd at noon.
3. **Article Review.** 3-5 pages. (20 percent). Due at any point before last class.
4. **Final Exam:** Practice Comprehensive Exam (20 per cent).

Assignments turned in late (that means after the start of class on the day they are due) lose one letter grade for each day they are late. For example, an “A” paper becomes a “B” paper.

1. Participation

A critical component of the course is lively discussion of the week’s readings. You should be prepared to discuss each reading on the syllabus for each week. You have not completed the readings until you are able to succinctly restate the argument, describe the methodology, and identify the strengths and weaknesses of the work. In other words, reading the article once, or worse, skimming the abstract, the introduction and conclusion alone, will not suffice. We will discuss several strategies for reading articles to get the most out of them.

You should assess the logical consistency, clarity, and novelty of the theoretical argument. Does it produce new insights? Are the assumptions of the theory clear and reasonable? Is the logic of the theory internally consistent? Do the hypotheses flow logically from the theory? Does the theory generate hypotheses that could be tested, but are not? Does the theory suggest possible causal mechanisms? Are those mechanisms tested?

You should also assess the evidence provided in support of the argument. Are the empirical tests convincing? Are the procedures used to assess the argument described adequately? Are the measures valid and reliable? Does the author consider multiple mechanisms which may link variables? Are other interpretations of the evidence more plausible? What of the possibility of reverse causality, omitted variable bias, selection bias, and endogeneity? How important are these problems? Can they be addressed? If so, how? What other tests could have been done to assess the argument?

You should also consider the implications of the argument. Has the author made claims that extend beyond the evidence? Are the findings important? If so, for what? For substantive outcomes? For normative reasons? For social science? (Filling a hole in the literature is not always a reason to write an article. Some holes aren't worth filling.) Has the author convinced you that you should care about the finding? How does this work relate to similar work? To what related topics could the theory, evidence, or research design apply? Are there policy implications for the work? Most generally, is the research question worth the time and effort need to answer it?

Remember to consider strengths and weaknesses of the arguments. Be wary of the "graduate student disease." Symptoms include over the top criticism accompanied by an inability to recognize high quality work.

The participation grade includes three components:

Class Discussion. You will be graded on the quality of your participation not just on the quantity. Making a few well thought out additions to the debate is much preferred to frequent, but shallow interventions. I love to cold call on students and I can assure you that during each class each student will either speak of their own accord or be called upon to discuss a particular reading.

Presentation. Each week a student will present a short 5-minute report on one of the recommended readings. Other topics are also welcome. Weak presentations will simply summarize the readings ("Smith says x, Jones says y"). Strong presentations will:

Describe any key conceptual issues that must be addressed by work on the question (e.g., a presentation on inequality might discuss different ways of conceptualizing inequality);

Describe the central arguments/debates in the literature on the question (e.g., a presentation on corruption might focus on different types of variables -- such as regime type, decentralization, level of development -- that influence corruption levels);

Describe thorny methodological issues that bedevil work on the question (e.g., a presentation on social revolutions might discuss the problems created by the small-n nature of the phenomenon).

Offer criticisms and/or suggest pathways for future research.

Reaction Comments. Each week each student will post reaction comments on the course blog. These comments should not exceed a paragraph. A sentence or two will do. Do not summarize the readings. The comments are due on Monday at 7:00 PM. Be sure to read other posts before coming to class.

2. Research Design Essay

The research design paper (roughly 15 pages) should identify a research question, explain why this question is important, propose a strategy for answering the question, and then discuss possible strengths and weaknesses of the proposal. A weak essay will simply do the above. A strong paper will propose a novel topic that sheds light on an important debate; identifies how and why this paper may make a contribution to the literature and propose a reasonable research strategy. A strong paper will also include a careful critique of the research design identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the proposal. This is a chance for you to begin to develop your own ideas for research even if you do not have time to actually collect the data necessary to assess the argument. Three-page outline is due April 16th. You can post it to Courseworks under “Assignments.” Final draft due April 30th before class.

3. Practice Comprehensive Exam During Finals Week. During Finals week you will answer two comprehensive exam style questions. This will offer a chance to experience all the thrills of the comprehensive exam in a lower risk environment. The comprehensive exams are designed to illustrate how well you comprehend the literature in comparative politics and your answer should demonstrate your knowledge. It is not a contest to see how many citations you can cram into a single essay. It is usually better to address one or two themes in your answer in depth rather than to address a range of topics in a superficial fashion.

4. Article Review. You should write a review of any of the articles or books on the syllabus that must be circulated to the class prior to our meeting. E-mail is fine.

The review should have three components:

- Brief summation (one paragraph) of the main argument made by the author and the evidence provided.
- An evaluation and critique of the author’s argument and evidence. Does the author’s argument make sense? Why or why not? Does the evidence (if any) comport with his/her argument? Why or why not? Do you know of other evidence that undermines (or supports) the author’s argument? Does one of the other readings for that day offer a perspective that is discordant with the perspective offered by the author? This section should constitute the lion’s share of the paper.

- A recommendation (reject the manuscript, major revision, minor revision, publish as is) to the (fictitious) editor with your reasons for why you hold this view.

January 22. Week 1. Introduction and Thinking about Thinking

Albert O. Hirschman. "The Search for Paradigms as a Hindrance to Understanding," *World Politics*, 1970, 22:3, pp. 329-343. <https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2009600.pdf>

Heath, Chip and Stan Heath. *Made To Stick*. Intro, chpts 1-4, 6.

Recommended:

Van Oech. Roger *A Whack on the Side of the Head. How You Too Can Be More Creative* Warner Books. Third Edition.

Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What Causes Democratization?" *Oxford Handbook of Political Science*. Oxford University Press.

Huber, John. 2013. "Is Theory Getting Lost in the Identification Revolution?" ms. <http://themonkeycage.org/2013/06/14/is-theory-getting-lost-in-the-identification-revolution/>

"Ten Rules for Writing Fiction." <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/feb/20/ten-rules-for-writing-fiction-part-one>

Michael. C. Munger. 2017. "Scholars Talk Writing." *Chronicle of Higher Education*. June 18. <https://www.chronicle.com/article/Scholars-Talk-Writing-Michael/240354>

January 29. Week 2. The State I.

Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital and the European State, AD 990-1990*. Oxford Press, Chapters 1-3.

Margaret Levi. 1988. *Of Rule and Revenue*. University of California Press. 1-48, 185-204. (95-121 recommended).

Jeffrey Herbst. 2000. *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton University Press. 1-57.

James Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, New Have: Yale University Press, 1-83. Chpt. 6. Conclusion

Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg. "Why Africa's Weak States: Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood." *World Politics* 1982 35:1: 1-24. <https://www.african.cam.ac.uk/images/files/articles/jackson>

Recommended:

Samuel Moyn. 2017. “Barbarian Virtues.” “Review of James C. Scott’s *Against the Grain*.” <https://www.thenation.com/article/barbarian-virtues/>

James Robinson. “Review of States and Power in Africa” *Journal of Economic Literature*. Vol. XL (June 2002), pp. 510–51.

Theda Skocpol. 1979. *States and Social Revolution*, Cambridge University Press. 1-111.

Douglass North. *Structure and Change in Economic History*, New York, Norton Press. 1981. 1-71. C

Diego Gambetta. 1993. *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection*. Cambridge. Harvard University Press.

Scott Page. 2006. “Path Dependence.” *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*. 1: 87-115.

David, Paul A., “Clio and the Economics of QWERTY” *American Economic Review*, Vol. 75, No. 2, *Papers and Proceedings of the Ninety-Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association*. (May, 1985), pp. 332-337.

Neil M. Kay. 2013. “Lock-In, Path Dependence, and the Internationalization of QWERTY.” University of Strathclyde. Ms. http://seminars.wcfia.harvard.edu/files/pegroup/files/neil_kay_2013.pdf

Feb 5. Week 3. The State II

Isabela Mares and Didac Queralt. “The non-democratic origins of income taxation.” *Comparative Political Studies*, 2015. doi: 10.1177/0010414015592646. URL <http://cps.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/07/28/0010414015592646.abstract>

Alisha Holland. 2016. *Forbearance As Redistribution*. Cambridge University Press. 1-100, 277-326.

Scheve, Kenneth and David Stasavage. 2012. “Democracy, War, and Wealth: Lessons from Two Centuries of Inheritance Taxation,” *American Political Science Review*. 106:1, 81:102.

Kimuli Kasara. “Tax Me If You Can: Ethnic Geography, Democracy, and the Taxation of Agriculture in Africa. *American Political Science Review*. 101(01):159–172, 2007. ISSN 1537-5943. doi:doi:10.1017/S0003055407070050. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055407070050>

Recommended:

Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor. Political science and the three new institutionalisms. *Political Studies*, 44(5):936–957, 1996. ISSN 1467-9248. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.1996.tb00343.x>

Glaser, Edward et. el. “Do Institutions Cause Growth.” Ms.

William H. Riker. Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions. *The American Political Science Review*, 74(2):432–446, 1980. ISSN 00030554. doi: 10.2307/1960638. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1960638>

Greif, Avner. Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: From Communal to Individual Responsibility. *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE)*, 158(1):168–204, 2002. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40753063>.

H. Peyton Young. The economics of convention. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 10(2):105–122, 1996. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2138484>

February 12. Week 4. Bureaucracy and State Capacity

Huber, John and Charles Shipan, *Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy*. New York Cambridge University Press. Chaps 1-4, 6.

Geddes, Barbara. “A Game Theoretic Model of Reform in Latin American Democracies,” *American Political Science Review* 85:2 (1991), 371-92. (for more see her book, *Politicians’ Dilemma*.)

Raghabendra Chattopadhyay and Esther Duflo. Women as policy makers: Evidence from a randomized policy experiment in India. *Econometrica*, 72(5):1409–1443, 2004. ISSN 1468-0262. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00539.x. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3598894>

Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor, and Jean Francois-Richard. 2003. “The Transplant Effect.” *American Journal of Comparative Law* 51: 163-204. J. [http://www.columbia.edu/~kp2022/Articles/7\)%20AJCL%202003.pdf](http://www.columbia.edu/~kp2022/Articles/7)%20AJCL%202003.pdf)

Besley, Timothy. "Political Selection." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19.3 (2005): 43-60.

Moe, Terry. “Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story.” *Journal of Law Economics and Organization*, 1990 7: 213-253. Also Comment by Williamson. https://files-politicalscience-stanford-edu.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/politicalinstitutions_neglectedside.pdf

Recommended:

Rasul, Imran and Daniel Rogger. 2013. "Management of Bureaucrats and Public Service Delivery: Evidence from the Nigerian Civil Service." 2013. Ms. London.

Leonard Wantchekon, 2004. The Paradox of "Warlord" Democracy: A Theoretical Investigation. *American Political Science Review* 98 (1): 17-33.

Volkov, Vadim. 2002. *Violent Entrepreneurs: The Role of Force in Russian Capitalism*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Andrei Shleifer and Edward Glaeser. 2002. "Legal Origins." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* November, 1193-1229. J

Goemans, Hein and Alexandre Debs. 2010. Regime Type, The Fate of Leaders and War. *American Political Science Review*, Volume 104, No. 3 (August), pp.430-446.

Timothy Frye. A politics of institutional choice post-communist presidencies. *Comparative Political Studies*, 30(5):523–552, 1997. URL <http://cps.sagepub.com/content/30/5/523.short>

February 19. Week 5. Corruption

Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny. 1993. "[Corruption](#)" *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, August, 599-617.

Amanda Lea Robinson and Brigitte Seim (2018), "Who is Targeted in Corruption? Disentangling the Effects of Wealth and Power on Exposure to Bribery", *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*: Vol. 13: No. 3, pp 313-331. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00017067>

Ben Olken and Rohini Panda. 2012. "Corruption in Developing Countries." Ms 1-51. <https://www.nber.org/papers/w17398.pdf> (a review so you can skim)

Hellman JS, Jones G, Kaufmann D. 2003. "[Seize the state, seize the day: an empirical analysis of state capture and corruption in transition economies.](#)" *Journal of Comparative Economics* 31(4):751—73

John McMillan and Pablo Zoido. "[How To Subvert Democracy: Montesinos in Peru.](#)" *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 2004. 18:4, 69-92.

Claudio Ferraz and Fred Finan. (2008). "[Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes](#)", *QJE*, 123(2), 703-745. J.

Simpser, Alberto. 2017. "The Culture of Corruption Across Generations." Ms. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2241295

Recommended:

Abhijit Bannerjee, Donald Green, Jeffrey McManus, Rohini Panda. "Are Poor Voters Indifferent to Whether Elected Leaders are Criminal or Corrupt? A Vignette Experiment in Rural India." *Political Communications*, 31:3, 2014: pp. 391-407.

Daniel Treisman, "What Have We Learned about Corruption?" *Annual Review of Political Science*. 2007. 10:211-244.

Eggers, Andrew C., and Jens Hainmueller. "MPs for sale? Returns to office in postwar British politics." *American Political Science Review* 103.04 (2009): 513-533.

Chong, Alberto, Ana L. De La O, Dean Karlan and Leonard Wantchekon. 2011. "Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes." NBER. Working Paper. 17679.

Leonid Peisakhin and Paul Pinto. 2011. "Is Transparency an Effective Anti-Corruption Strategy?" Evidence from a Field Experiment in India." *Regulation and Governance* 4:3, 261-280. <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2010.01081.x/full>

Reinikka, R., and J. Svensson, "Fighting Corruption to Improve Schooling: Evidence from a Newspaper Campaign in Uganda", *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 3(2 - 3) (2005), 259–267.

Fisman, Raymond (2001), "Estimating the Value of Political Connections." *American Economic Review* 91 (4), pp. 1095-1102.
http://www1.gsb.columbia.edu/faculty/rfisman/estimating_the_value.pdf

February 26. Week 6. Democratization

Seymour Martin Lipset, Seymour M. Lipset. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53: 69-105.

Przeworski, Adam. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. 1991. Pages 11-50, 136-187.

Wood, Elisabeth Jean. 2001. "An Insurgent Path to Democracy: Popular Mobilization, Economic Interests and Regime Transition in South Africa and El Salvador." *Comparative Political Studies*. 2001 34: 86.

Boix, Carles. 2003. *Redistribution and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press, 1-131, 233-240.

Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press. 1-45. Skim 173-218.

Recommended:

Barrington Moore. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston: Beacon Press. Chapters 1-3, one chapter in Part II, chapters 7-9 and epilogue.

Theda Skocpol. 1973. "A Critical Review of Barrington Moore's Social Origins," *Politics and Society* 4 (Fall), pages 1-34.

Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well Being in the World, 1950-1990*. Cambridge. Chapters 1-2.

Satyanath. Shanker, Nico Voigtlander and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2013. "Bowling for Fascism: Social Capital and the Rise of the Nazi Party in Weimar Germany, 1919-33." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 19201. 1-46.

March 4. Week 7. Democracy II.

Haggard, Stephan and Robert Kaufman. 2012. "Inequality and Regime Change: Democratic Transitions and the Stability of Democratic Rule." *American Political Science Review*. 106:3 495- 516.

Ansell, Ben W. and David J. Samuel. 2014. *Inequality and Democratization: An Elite Competition Approach*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1, 3-5.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 2002. "[Accounting for Postcommunist Regime Diversity: What Counts as a Good Cause?](#)" In *Capitalism and Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe*, ed. Gregorz Ekiert and Stephen Hanson, Cambridge University Press.

Paxton, Pamela. "Gendering Democracy." In eds. Gary Goertz and Amy G. Mazur. *Politics, Gender and Concepts: Theory and Methodology*. Cambridge University Press.

Recommended

Haber, Stephen and Victor Menaldo, 2011. "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse." *American Political Science Review*. Feb. 1-26.

Ross, Stephen and Jørgen Juel Andersen 2011. "Making the Resource Curse Disappear: A re-examination of Haber and Menaldo's "Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism?" Draft: September 30, 2011.

Dunning, Thad. 2008. *Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes* Cambridge University Press. 1-36. 107-146.

Sachs, J. and A. M. Warner. 1995. "Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth." NBER Working Paper No. 5398.

Robinson, James A., Ragnar Torvik, and Thierry Verdier. 2006. "The Political Foundations of the Resource Curse." *Journal of Development Economics* 79: 2, 447-468

Djankov, Simeon, Jose G. Montalvo and Marta Reynal-Querol. "The Curse of Aid." *Journal of Economic Growth*. <http://www.springerlink.com/content/b5369m3870553g17/fulltext.pdf>

Morrison, Kevin M. What Can We Learn about the "Resource Curse" from Foreign Aid? *World Bank Research Observer*. Advance Access published October 27, 2010

March 11 Week 8. Autocracy I

Gehlbach, Scott, Konstantin Sonin, and Milan Svolik. "Formal Models of Non-Democratic Politics." Annual Review of Political Science. <http://scottgehlbach.net/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Gehlbach-Sonin-Svolik-ARPS.pdf>

Barbara Geddes, Erica Frantz and Joseph Wright. Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/autocratic-breakdown-and-regime-transitions-a-new-data-set/EBDB9E5E64CF899AD50B9ACC630B593F>

Svolik, Milan. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press.

Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way. The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy*. 2002. https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/levitsky/files/SL_elections.pdf

Lisa Blaydes. 2018. *State of Repression: Iraq Under Saddam Hussein*. 1-60, 3-5-321.

Recommended:

Bellin, Eva. 2004. The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective. *Comparative Politics*, 36(2):139–157, 2004. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4150140>

Haber, Stephen. "Authoritarian Government." In eds. Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*.

Egorov G, Guriev S, Sonin K. 2009. "[Why resource poor dictators allow freer media: a theory and evidence from panel data.](#)" *American Political Science Review* 103(4):645–68

Goemans. Hein, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Giacomo Chiazzi. 2009. "Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders," *Journal of Peace Research*. 46:2, 269-283.

Alberto Simpser. 2013. *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections*. Cambridge University Press. 1-31, 61-78, 239-243.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy. The Politics of Party Hegemony and its Demise*. Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1-3.

Rory Truex. 2016. *Making Autocracy Work: Representation and Responsiveness in Modern China*. Cambridge. 1-45, 176-190.

Ashlea Rundlett and Milan Svobik. "Deliver the Vote: Micro-motives and Macro-behavior in Electoral Fraud." *American Political Science Review*, 2016.110:1, 179-197. <https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/campuspress.yale.edu/dist/6/1038/files/2016/06/Rundlett-Svobik-2016-APSR-28nvedc.pdf>

Pepinsky, Thomas. 2013. "The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism." *British Journal of Political Science*. 44:3, 631-653.

Kuran, Timur. 1991. "Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989 (in Liberalization and Democratization in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe)," *World Politics* 44 (October): 7-48

Shih, Victor, Christopher Adolph and Mingxing Liu 2012. "Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China." *American Political Science Review*, 106:1, 166-187.

Molly Roberts. *Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China's Great Firewall*. Princeton University Press. 2018.

March 18. Week 9. Spring Break

March 26. Week 10. Political Violence: Causes and Consequences

Steven Wilkinson, 2004. *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1-2 and 5-6.

Mona Lee Krook, "Violence Against Women in Politics." *Journal of Democracy* 28:1. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/645539>

Lauren Young. "The Psychology of State Repression: Fear and Dissent Decisions in Zimbabwe." *American Political Science Review* 2018. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S000305541800076X>

Stathis Kalyvas. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics). Cambridge University Press, 2006. ISBN 0521670047 Chapter 1, 2.

Omar Garcia-Ponce and Ben Pasquale. "How Political Repression Shapes Attitudes Toward the State: Evidence from Zimbabwe."

http://omargarciaponce.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/07/GarciaPonce_and_Pasquale_2014.pdf

Further Readings

Oleg Khlevniuk. "The Objectives of the Great Terror, 1937-38." In *Stalinism*, Ed. David Hoffman. p. 184-204.

John Gaventa. *Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence & Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley*. 1-34.

Christopher Blattman and Edward Miguel. "Civil War." *Journal of Economic Literature*, 48(1):3-57, September 2010. doi: 10.1257/jel.48.1.3. URL

<http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257>

Wood, Elisabeth Jean. *Insurgent collective action and civil war in El Salvador*. Cambridge University Press, 2003 Chapter 2.

Lustick. Ian. 1996. "History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias." *American Political Science Review*. 90:3 605-18.

Engerman S, Sokoloff K. 2002. "[Factor endowments, inequality, and paths of development among New World Economies.](#)" *Economia* 3(1):41-88.

Coatsworth, John. 2005. "[Structures, Endowments and Institutions in the Economic History of Latin America,](#)" *Latin American Research Review*, 40:3.

April 9. Week 11. Economic Growth and Property Rights

Robert H Bates. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*. University of California Press, 1981 Chapters 1-3 & 5.

Joel Hellman. "[Winners Take All: The Pitfalls of Partial Reform,](#)" World Politics, January 1998.

Ronald Coase. 1960. "The Problem of Social Cost." *The Journal of Law and Economics* 3:1, 1-44, J C

Erica Field, Seema Jayachandran, and Rohini Pande, 2010. "Do Traditional Institutions Constrain Female Entrepreneurship? A Field Experiment on Business Training in India."

American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 100 (May 2010): 125–129.
<https://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.100.2.125>

Benjamin Jones and Benjamin Olken 2005. “Do Leaders Matter? National Leaders and Growth Since World War II.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics*. Vol. 120, No. 3, 835-864

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson. 2001. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation. *American Economic Review* 91: 1369-1401.

Recommended:

Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson and Andrei Shleifer and Simon Johnson. 2001. “Coase Against the Coasians.” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* August, 116: 3, 853-899.

Albouy, David. 2012. “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment.” *American Economic Review* 102: 3059-3076.

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson. 2011. “Hither Thou Shalt Come, But No Further: Reply to “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation: Comment. Ms.

Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales. 2006. “Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?” *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 2:2006, 23-48.

Stephen Haber et al. 2003. *The Politics of Property Rights: Political Instability, Credible Commitments and Economic Growth in Mexico, 1876-1929*. Cambridge University Press.

Banerjee, Abhijit and Lakshmi Iyer. “History, institutions, and economic performance: The legacy of colonial land tenure systems in India.” *The American Economic Review*, 95(4):1190–1213, September 2005. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4132711D>

David Stasavage. 2002. “Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited.” *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*. 18,1. 155-86.

Irina Denisova, Markus Eller, Timothy Frye, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. “Who wants to revise privatization? the complementarity of market skills and institutions.” *American Political Science Review*, 103(02):284–304, 2009. ISSN 1537-5943. doi: doi:10.1017/S0003055409090248. URL <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409090248>

Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson. 2005. “Unbundling Institutions.” *Journal of Political Economy*. 113: 5, 949-995.

Philip Keefer and Steven C. Knack. 2002. Polarization, Politics and Property Rights: Links Between Inequality and Growth. *Public Choice* 111 April 1-2, 127-154.

April 16. Week 12. Small Group Discussion of Research Proposals

April 23. Week 13. Comparative Politics of Gender and Representation

Symposium: A Comparative Politics of Gender. Perspectives on Politics.

March 2010 8: Essays by Karen Beckwith, Teri L. Caraway, Leslie Schwindt-Bayer, Aili Mari Tripp and Lisa Baldez. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/issue/FF945D69CA2A36F8E3200D7500F6CDB1>

Krook, Mona Lena. 2006. "Reforming Representation: The Diffusion of Candidate Gender Quotas Worldwide." *Politics and Gender*. 2:3, 303-327.

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